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The South African Government publicly announced its intention to table the Regulation of Land Holdings 
Bill in Parliament soon, as part of their land reform priority. This potential new law aims to prohibit 
foreign ownership of agricultural land and to place ceilings on the size of agricultural land that citizens 
and foreigners may own. Foreigners will be allowed to conclude long term leases. Some parties most 
likely to be affected by this proposed new Bill are South Africa’s fellow WTO Members in services trade 
and investors from its BIT partner countries. As a WTO Member and BIT partner, SA undertook various 
contractual obligations and commitments. 
The primary objective of this study is therefore to determine whether, by promulgating the proposed Bill, 
South Africa might be violating any of these obligations or commitments. This is done by considering 
firstly the policy and constitutional background of the Bill in light of the General and Specific GATS 
commitments such as the MFN, Transparency, National Treatment and Market Access Commitments. 
The outcome of this analysis shows that South Africa may violate its National Treatment and Market 
Access Specific Commitments by imposing the ban on foreign ownership of agricultural land. This is 
because those foreign services providers intending to own (as opposed to leasing) agricultural land to 
establish commercial presence in South Africa, will be prohibited from doing so - despite South Africa’s 
GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments not indicating any such land ownership restrictions either 
horizontally or sector-specifically. Examples of affected service sectors are the Tourism, Manufacturing 
and Construction sectors. It is then concluded that (i) South Africa could potentially raise the public order 
General Exception against any possible violation claims; but (ii) that South Africa should in the 
alternative, rather consider modifying or withdrawing some of its GATS Commitments. The protections 
which South Africa’s BITs provide are then analysed in light of what is publicly known about the 
proposed Bill. It is concluded, for example, that the restriction of the property rights of existing foreign 
owners of agricultural land in South Africa by restricting their rights to dispose of their land to South 
Africans only – may constitute indirect expropriation for which they should be compensated in terms of 
relevant BITs. Although the country’s investment policy vis a vis BIT has changed leading to the 
termination of, for example, some European-South African BITs, these agreements all contain sunset 
clauses opening up the country for potential investor-state arbitration claims for up to 20 years. The thesis 
concludes with the recommendation that South Africa carefully considers the implications of potential 
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On its re-entry into world trade in 1994 with the demise of Apartheid, South Africa as an original 
member of the Word Trade Organisation (the ‘WTO’) and as a new democracy, undertook 
significant international trade and investment commitments as, inter alia, a multilateral and 
bilateral contracting party in the global economy. Needless to say, these external commitments 
were only the metaphorical tip of the iceberg for South Africa as its newly elected Government 
(the ‘Government’) naturally had the main aim of eradicating the effects of Apartheid 
domestically. Today, still as a developing country facing tough economic and political challenges 
mostly initiated by the prowling effects of its colonial and economically divided past, the 
country’s legal policies and laws, amongst others, tell tales of a society where the eradication of 
cultural division is still a serious political and legal priority.  
One such policy and potential law relating to Government’s land reform goals, was 
revealed recently when the current President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, in the 2015 annual 
State of the Nation Address1 and reiterated in his Address on 11 February 2016,2 (the ‘Address’), 
announced that the Government plans to introduce the proposed Regulation of Land Holdings 
Bill (the ‘RLHB’ or the ‘Bill’). The effect of the RLHB on proclamation will, inter alia, be the 
prohibition of foreign acquisition of agricultural land and the introduction of land ceilings for 
South Africans and existing foreign owners of agricultural land.3 According to the President, the 
restriction of foreign acquisition of agricultural land will be ‘fair’ as foreigners will still be 
1President Jacob Zuma: ‘State of the Nation Address’ (2015) available here: http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-
zuma-state-nation-address-2015, accessed on 17 February 2017. 
2  Press Statement by the Parliament of South Africa; ‘President Jacob Zuma: Response to Debate on the State of the 
Nation Address’, dated 18 February 2016; available at: 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=8705&Revision=en/82&SearchStart=0, accessed on 17 
February 2017. 
3 Ibid, note 2. 
2 
 
allowed to conclude long term leases in respect thereof.4 The President stated further, in relation 
to land acquired by foreigners in South Africa,5 that:  
 
“To buy … [land] and make it your property when a good percentage of South African 
cities have no land… is very difficult to justify when people… don’t own land and part 
of our country is being owned by people out there.” 
 
The Government has maintained that the Bill is following the example of many other 
countries6 who have implemented similar laws or are considering doing so.7 The purpose of this 
Bill, when enacted, will be for land reform.8 To date, however, the Bill has not yet been 
introduced for comment and it is uncertain when this can be expected – albeit being reported by 
Parliament that it would have been released during 2016.9 In the meantime it appears, that South 
Africa’s direct next-door neighbour, Namibia, has overtaken South Africa by very recently 
publishing a bill aiming to prohibit foreign ownership of agricultural land (‘FOAL’) as well. 
This is referred to briefly for purposes of possible contextualisation. Although the concept of 
prohibition of foreign ownership seems like a foreign concept for the ‘new’ South Africa, a 
deeper look into this concept has shown that this worldwide phenomenon is in existence for long 
as countries have always feared ‘foreign take-over’.10 
 
As my research will indicate, the proposed Bill has had a longer history than apparent as 
Government has investigated the notion of regulating foreign ownership of land for years for 
                                                                
4 South African Government News Agency, “Proposal to stop foreign land ownership ‘fair’: President” Available at: 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/proposal-stop-foreign-land-ownership-%e2%80%98fair%e2%80%99-
president, accessed on 17 December 2016. 
5 Brand South Africa, 'South Africa’s land ownership proposals ‘are fair’” (2015) available at: 
https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/south-africa-fast-facts/news-facts/land-ownership-160215. 
6 Such as ‘Australia, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Kenya, Ghana and certain South American countries’. 
7 South African Government News Agency, ‘Land Holdings Bill to be presented to Parliament’, 11 February 2016, 
available at: http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/land-holdings-bill-be-presented-cabinet, accessed on 17 
December 2016.  
8 President Jacob Zuma, ‘State of the Nation Address 2016’ available here: http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-
jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2016-11-feb-2016-0000 accessed 17 December 2016. 
9 Press Statement by the Parliament of South Africa; President Jacob Zuma: Response to Debate on the State of the 
Nation Address, dated 18 February 2016; available at: 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=8705&Revision=en/82&SearchStart=0. 
10 For a study into this concept, please see: Stephen Hodgson, Cormac Cullinan and Karen Campbell, ‘Land 
Ownership And Foreigners: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Approaches to the Acquisition and use of Land 
by Foreigners’ (1999), FAO Legal Papers Online #6, available at: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo6.pdf, Page 21, accessed on 19 January 2017. 
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purposes of land redistribution.11 Recent academic reporting, however, concluded that there is no 
clear correlation between foreign property ownership and local redistribution of land despite the 
‘hype’12 which seems to exist.  
 
Whilst many foreigners might be anxiously awaiting the reveal of the RLHB’s content, this 
thesis aims to analyse in the context of International Trade Law, the possible legal consequences 
of the RLHB on international trade in services and investment with South Africa. This is because 
the parties perhaps most interested in the outcome of the Bill internationally will be South 
Africa’s contracting partners, for example, under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (the ‘GATS’) and its various Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’) partners. Hereby the 
country undertook considerable trade and investment supportive contractual commitments and 
obligations. Current Government policy acknowledge the ‘complementary relationship’ between 
trade and investment and that investment and trade can act as a mutual stimulus.13  
This study of some international commitments and obligations of South Africa will show 
that South Africa opened its doors wide to international trade and investment when entering its 
democratic political dispensation, striving for inclusion in world trade after years of economic 
isolation.14 In doing so, it seems that the country might have overplayed its hand in the 
International Law context by giving up too much of its sovereign power to make domestic laws 
aimed at rectifying the wrongs of the past. For instance, the thesis indicates why South Africa 
might be violating its Market Access and National Treatment specific commitments under the 
GATS and why it might be vulnerable to possible compensation in respect of indirect 
expropriation claims by investors from its BIT partner countries.  
                                                                
11 Amanda Swanson, ‘The Effect of Foreign Property Ownership in South Africa on Local Land Redistribution’ 
submitted to the University of Cape Town with Prof Hanri Mostert (2011), available at: 
http://landlawwatch.co.za/download/2011/LLP/LLP-2011-Swanson-Foreign%20Ownership.pdf, at pages 20-21. 
12 Amanda Swanson, ‘The Effect of Foreign Property Ownership in South Africa on Local Land Redistribution’ 
submitted to the University of Cape Town with Prof Hanri Mostert (2011), 
http://landlawwatch.co.za/download/2011/LLP/LLP-2011-Swanson-Foreign%20Ownership.pdf, at page 21. 
13 Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, ‘South Africa’s Trade and Investment Policy, a Presentation to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee’, (2015) available at: 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/SA_Trade_Investment_Policy.pdf, at Page 21, accessed on 12 January 
2017. 
14 Ibid note 13 - For example, it has been said by the DTI itself that SA’s services sectors are very open as its WTO 
Services commitments actually exceed some OECD countries. 
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While the thesis indicates the importance of countries, like South Africa, regaining their 
law-making abilities in relation to their vital domestic socio-economic goals, it also tries to 
showcase the limitations and potential international legal liability faced by South Africa when 
attempting to implement laws like the RLHB.  
Whilst the possibility of this Bill has been both welcomed and criticised15 in South Africa 
based on its probable impact on the Government’s policies relating to land reform and due to the 
economic effect on foreign direct investment in South Africa – a few important questions remain 
from an International Trade Law perspective.  
With the ultimate purpose of determining if South Africa may be held accountable to its 
international trading partners based on existing contractual obligations and commitments, these 
questions are as follows:  
 
(i) Chapter 1: What is the RLHB’s content, purpose, policy and constitutional origin? 
(ii) Chapter 1: What are some of the possible economic impacts the RLHB will have?  
(iii) Chapter 2: Will the promulgation of the RLHB be in compliance with South Africa’s 
most favoured nation obligations, its specific ‘market access’ and ‘national treatment’ 
commitments under the GATS, and are any general exceptions applicable? and 
(iv) Chapter 3: Will the promulgation of the RLHB violate any of South Africa’s treaty 
obligations under its BITs, and what is South Africa’s current position on BITs?  
                                                                
15 Examples: SA Commercial Prop News, ‘SA Property Owners upset with ban on Foreign Land (note line spacing)  
Ownership in South Africa’ (2015), available at: http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/business-
specialties/legal-and-policy/7129-sa-property-owners-upset-with-ban-of-foreign-land-ownership-in-sa.html; 






The Proposed Regulation of Land Holdings Bill: its Content, Purpose, 
Policy & Constitutional Background and Economic Effects 
 
An investigation into the lawfulness of the RLHB under International Trade Law requires a 
better understanding of its probable content, purpose, policy and Constitutional background. This 
Chapter therefore seeks to engage with the Government’s motives for earmarking the RLHB. 
Furthermore, it will also deal with some of the possible practical and economic outcomes of the 
prohibition of FOAL in South Africa.  
 
1.1 The Content and Purpose of the Proposed Regulation of Land Holdings 
Bill 
To date, the RLHB has not been submitted to Parliament. The only information currently 
available on this proposed Bill is therefore limited to statements made by the Government in the 
public domain and via official and other media reports. 
 
So, for example, the President’s most recent official announcement on the RLHB16 was 
during his State of the Nation Address in 201617 when he stated the following: 
‘…Land reform remains an important factor as we pursue transformation. […] 
I also announced the Regulation of Land Holdings Bill, which would place a ceiling on 
land ownership at a maximum of 12 000 hectares and would prohibit foreign 
nationals from owning land….’ [Emphasis added.] 
 
                                                                
16 The President did not make any mention of the proposed Bill during the State of the Nation Address on 9 
February 2017, available at: http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-jacob-zuma-2017-state-nation-address-9-feb-
2017-0000, accessed on 11 February 2017. 
17 Ibid n1. 
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Following this, during a debate on the Address,18 he clarified the position as follows: 
‘…The Regulation of Agricultural19 Land Holdings Bill will prohibit the acquisition of 
agricultural land by foreign nationals. They can only lease the land….’                   
[Emphasis added.] 
Furthermore, ‘foreigners’ have been confirmed by the Presidency in February 2015 to include: 
‘foreign nationals and juristic persons […] as well as juristic persons whose dominant 
shareholder or controller is a foreign controlled enterprise, entity or interest’.20  
Additional information on the RLHB’s possible content and purpose has subsequently been 
shared by the President and the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, Gugile 
Nkwinti (the ‘Minister’), which include the following:  
(i) The RLHB will be enacted for land reform purposes;21  
(ii) Foreigners will still be allowed to acquire residential property;22 
(iii) They will also be allowed to lease agricultural land for between 30 and 50 years; 23 
(iv) Recognition was given that the RLHB cannot apply ‘retrospectively without 
constitutional infringements,’ and therefore, foreigners with existing ‘freehold’ titles 
will not have their tenure altered by the promulgation of the RLHB;24  
(v) In respect of existing foreign owners of agricultural land, a right of first refusal may 
apply in ‘favour of another South African citizen in freehold or the state if the land 
is deemed strategic;’25 
                                                                
18 Ibid n2. 
19 The word ‘agricultural’ was subsequently omitted from the name of the proposed Bill. 
20 The Presidency, ‘President Jacob Zuma on legislation to come before Parliament’, (2015) available at: 
http://www.gov.za/sona-2015-legislation-come-parliament, accessed on 16 December 2016. 
21 President Jacob Zuma, ‘State of the Nation Address 2016’ available here: http://www.gov.za/speeches/president-
jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2016-11-feb-2016-0000. 
22 Dianne Hawker, ‘Zuma: foreigners can own houses but not farms’, (2015), available at: 
http://www.enca.com/south-africa/zuma-foreigners-can-own-houses-not-farms, accessed on 8 March 2017. 
23  Budget Policy Speech:  Minister G E Nkwinti (Mp) ‘Budget Vote 39:  Department Of Rural Development and 
Land Reform’ (2015), available here: http://www.dla.gov.za/speeches/category/333-2015, P5-7, accessed 28 
February 2017. 
24  SA Government News Agency, Land Holdings Bill to be presented to Cabinet, (2016) available at: 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/land-holdings-bill-be-presented-cabinet accessed on 17 December 2016. 
25 SA Government News Agency, ‘New legislations to come before Parliament,’ (2015) available at, 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/new-legislations-come-parliament, accessed on 4 March 2017. 
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(vi) South African individuals and entities as well as existing foreign owners of 
agricultural land will not be allowed to own land in excess of 12 000 hectares and 
this may entail the following:26  
a. Land in excess of this possible ceiling, will be ‘expropriated and redistributed.’ 
The compensation for such expropriation should be based on the ‘just and 
equitable’ principle provided for in Section 25(3) of the South African 
Constitution.27  
b. The ceilings may possibly apply only to ‘forestry, game farms and renewable 
energy farms, especially wind energy;’28and 
c. The ceilings might involve different maximum extents depending on the scale of 
farming;29  
(vii) Foreign ownership of certain forms of land such as, ‘environmentally and security 
sensitive lands as well as those that are of  historic and cultural significance, and 
strategic lands (for land reform and socio-economic development)’ will be 
discouraged;30 and 
(viii) The RLHB will establish a process of ‘compulsory land holdings disclosures’ in 
respect of ‘race, nationality, gender, extent of land owned and its use’ managed by a 
Land Commission.31 
 
Despite the above listed indications of some practical outcomes of the RLHB’s enactment, 
other critical practical considerations pertaining to existing foreign owners of agricultural land 
remain, in the author’s view, unclarified. These considerations are amongst the topics relevant to 
the lawfulness discussion in the next Chapters and include, for example: 
                                                                
26 Bowman Gilfillan, ‘The regulation of foreign land ownership in South Africa’ (2015) available at: 









(i) Whether and in what way the RLHB will deal with the effects of restricting the 
marketing, selling and transfer of foreign agricultural land to South Africans only. In 
itself this restriction, in the author’s view, constitutes a major impact of the 
proposed RLHB which affects, for example: 
a. From the viewpoint of such foreign owners, the current market prices of their 
properties - which in some instances resulted from large capital and other 
investments - may not be attainable on the open South African property market 
where the Rand currency is weaker than currencies in the developed world; and 
b. The RLHB may therefore be seen as restricting the ability of foreign sellers to 
sell their property which, in turn, will probably reduce the prices at which they 
wish to sell. 
 
(ii) There exists a concern amongst farm owners that the potential land ceilings will 
negatively impact on the economic viability of their farming operations which will, 
in turn affect competitiveness;32 
 
(iii) The extent of the possible restriction of the transfer of immovable property via the 
law of succession by existing foreign agricultural land owners to their foreign heirs, 
is unclear.  
a. Here it is interesting to note that this issue is dealt with in the draft Namibian 
Land Bill, which aims to prohibit FOAL for the similar purpose as the RLHB.33 
Clause 115(1)(a) thereof exempts from the prohibition of FOAL intestacy and 
testamentary dispositions if a foreign heir or legatee originally resides or does 
business in Namibia.  
b. If an heir or legatee does not ordinarily reside in Namibia (presuming they are 
foreigners), the Land Bill provides that the executor must offer to sell the land to 
                                                                
32 Ray Mahlaka, The Land Holdings Bill is impractical – industry players: Farm owners warn of competiveness 
challenges, (2015) available at: https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/industry/industry-players-pan-land-holdings-
bill-impractical/; accessed on 9 March 2017. 
33 Part 5 of Chapter 4 to the newly published Namibian Land Bill outright prohibits the acquisition of agricultural 
land by foreign nationals by either a transfer of ownership in the deeds registry, or via the direct or indirect 
acquisition of majority interest in a company or close corporation owning agricultural land. The purpose of the Land 
Bill is also for land reform in order to rectify the injustices of the past. (Clause 3) 
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the state which has a preferential right to purchase any agricultural land to be 
alienated by any owner.34  
 
(iv) The restriction of the transfer of agricultural land to foreign spouses in the event of 
divorce or death is unclear. 
a. This issue is also addressed in the Namibian Land Bill where Clause 115(1)(b) 
explicitly exempts from the prohibition to own agricultural land, transfers 
between spouses where the one is a foreigner and resides in Namibia.  
b. Here the Land Bill, however, only deals with marriages in community of 
property where the spouses in any event usually own the land in undivided equal 
shares. The question therefore is what would happen in the event of the spouses 
being married out of community of property where the one spouse is a foreigner 
and becomes entitled to the other half undivided share of the Namibian spouse 
in terms of the divorce order. The same question arises in the event of death of 
the Namibian spouse. 
c. Surely, in this instance, it would be gravely unfair to hold that divorced or 
surviving foreign spouses married out of community of property could not 
acquire agricultural land in terms of a divorce order or a will; 
 
(v) The impact on foreign financial services providers such as commercial banks and 
other financial service providers that have registered mortgage bonds as mortgagees 
over South African foreign owned agricultural property is unclear. In the event of 
default on the part of the mortgagors under such bonds, the question might be if 
foreign mortgagees can foreclose on the property and sell it in execution; and 
 
(vi) It is unclear what the position will be in respect of the rights of those foreigners who 
have concluded option to purchase agreements or are entitled to rights of first 
refusals in existing sale or lease agreements concluded in respect of agricultural 
land. 
                                                                
34 Clauses 115(1)(a) & 78(4), Land Bill. 
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From the above, one can conclude that while the RLHB is not submitted to Parliament, 
some of its essential content and impacts on existing and future foreign owners of agricultural 
land is unknown or unclear. We turn next to the policy and Constitutional background of the 
RLHB insofar as it lays down the potential national policy arguments for the RLHB. 
 
1.2 The Policy and Constitutional Background 
a) The Policy Background: 
Despite the abovementioned uncertainties of what the RLHB will contain, what is clear in 
respect of the purpose of the RLHB, is that the promulgation of this Bill forms part of 
Government’s current ‘radical’ position vis a vis land reform.35 Government has increasingly 
been subject public pressure36 due to the slow pace of existing land reform programs.37 Reasons 
for this slow pace and other policy grounds relating to the prohibition of FOAL, are what will be 
discussed next. 
My search for a dedicated and comprehensive policy on foreign ownership of agricultural 
land in South Africa led to various reports and policies affecting land reform. Four of these are 
significant for purposes of this thesis and will be mentioned briefly below, including: the White 
Paper on South African Land Policy, 1997 (the ‘White Paper’);38 the Report and 
Recommendations by the Panel of Experts on the Development of Policy regarding Land 
Ownership by Foreigners in South Africa’ (the ‘Panel Report’);39 the Green Paper on Land 
                                                                
35 Deneo Bendile, ‘ANC plans 'constitutional revolution' on land’ (2017) available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-
02-03-00-anc-hits-warp-speed-on-land/, accessed on 28 February 2017. 
36 Ibid n35. For example, in a recent interview of the Minister of Small Business and Development, Lindiwe Zulu, 
she said that the ANC government could no longer be “held to ransom by investors at the expense of citizens’ 
needs.” She was also quoted in saying that: “The bottom line is that we are in trouble. We need to fast-track the 
decisions we took.” 
37 Ibid n35. 
38 Available at: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/White-Papers/whitepaperlandreform.pdf, 
accessed on 28 February 2017. 
39 Department of Land Affairs 
‘Report and Recommendations by the Panel of Experts on the Development of Policy regarding 
Land Ownership by Foreigners in South Africa’, (2007) also published in Government Gazette 30239, Notice: 
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Reform (the ‘Green Paper’);40and more recently, the Agricultural Landholding Policy 
Framework (the ‘Policy Framework’).41  
 
A significant early mention of the prohibition of foreign ownership of land, can be traced 
back to 2005 when, during the National Land Summit, it was suggested that a ‘moratorium’ be 
instituted on foreign land ownership in South Africa.42 Reasons given for this were the existence 
of strong public opinion and perception that ‘unregulated ownership of … land by foreigners … 
contributed significantly to the lack of readily available and affordable land for land reform.’ 43 
In addition, the concern was raised, that the land reform program as provided for in the White 
Paper, which included land restitution, tenure security and redistribution, should move ‘at a 
faster pace’.44   
 
These concerns sparked Government’s official discussion of regulating foreign ownership 
of land which culminated, for example, in the Department of Land Affairs in 2007 publishing the 
comprehensive Panel Report as mentioned above, for public comment. The Panel of Experts that 
compiled this Report investigated, based on available yet insufficient Deeds Office data, the 
nature and extent of foreign land ownership in South Africa.45 
 
The purpose of the Report was to design a policy framework on foreign ownership of 
land.46  Foreign ownership was considered an ‘intervening factor’ of which the impact on 
ownership patterns in South Africa, and especially on land reform, was unknown.47 Various 
countries were visited such as Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore and England to analyse their laws in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
1081 of 2007,available at: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Foreign-land-
owners/PLOF_Report.pdf, accessed on 17 November 2016. 
40 As published in Government Gazette No. 34607, Notice 639 of 2011, dated 16 September 2011, Page 3, available 
at: http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/34607_gen639_0.pdf, accessed on 19 December 2016. 
41 Available at: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/legislation-and-policies/file/2052-agricultural-landing-policy-
framework, accessed on 4 March 2017. 
42 Ibid n39, P5. 
43 SA Government News Room, ‘Land Affairs on development of Policy on Regulation of Ownership of Land in SA 
by Foreigners’, (2006), available at: http://www.gov.za/land-affairs-development-policy-regulation-ownership-land-
sa-foreigners, accessed on 2 March 2017. 
44 Ibid n43. 
45 Ibid n39, P3. The Expert Panel was chaired by Prof. Shadrack Gutto, of the Centre for African Renaissance 
Studies at UNISA. 
46 Ibid n39, P5. 
47 Ibid n39, P5. 
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determining how they still managed to attract FDI despite regulating foreign land ownership.48 It 
was concluded that policies regulating foreign ownership were worldwide norms also for some 
countries with comparable levels of economic development.49  
 
 The Panel Report encapsulates findings from a public participation process which 
distinguished between pro-and-contra arguments.50 The Panel emphasised that both black and 
white ordinary South African citizens submitting commentary for their Report: ‘feel very 
strongly that acquisition of prime land by foreigners is denying them affordable access to land 
and rendering them strangers in their own country’.51  
 
A review of the arguments in favour of the regulation of foreign land ownership shows that 
the Recent Policy grounds mentioned by the President have been underpinning the drive toward 
the proposed RLHB for more than a decade.  
 
Some of the pro-regulation grounds in the Report, include that: (i) the ‘willing-buyer, 
willing-seller’ principle as laid down by Government for land redistribution, may encourage the 
‘free market’ for land but not ‘necessarily land reform.’52 This is, for example, because the Rand 
currency cannot compete on the open market and ‘prime agricultural land’ is therefore acquired 
by foreigners;53 (ii) ‘unregulated property developments,’ often entail the relocation of 
communities into towns and negatively affect established communities on rural land and 
established livelihoods dependent on subsistence farming;54 (iii) property developments (e.g. golf 
estates) restrict entry to coastal regions where inhabitants rely on fishing and fire-wood;55 (iv) 
new developments entail different skillsets and therefore, farmworkers are rarely ‘re-













game farms;57 (vii) game farms, lodges and golf estates erected on ‘high potential agricultural 
land’ may create less job opportunities than commercial farming.58 This also leads to land 
speculation; and (viii) game farming attracts more skilled as opposed to uneducated labour than 
commercial farming.59  
 
The Panel concluded, based on available statistics, that individual foreigners mainly 
acquire residential urban land and not agricultural land in South Africa.60 However, it appears 
that the owners of the majority of high valued farms in the ‘prime market’ with ‘high speculative 
value’ such as wine farms, are corporates.61 Due to shortcomings of the Deeds Registry System, 
the Panel had to rely on ‘anecdotal evidence’ from estate agents and banks to establish that 
‘foreign corporate ownership is substantial’ in respect of land.62 Nevertheless, the Panel also 
found that corporate ownership of wine farms in the Western Cape were ‘high in value but much 
lower in size.’63 The amount of foreign owned wine farms, however, was said to be increasing. 
 
Examples given of foreign corporate owners of wine farms involving substantial capital 
investment in South Africa included: the French family-owned Morgenhof Wine Estate in 
Stellenbosch and the Swiss-owned Dornier Wine Estate, to name a few.64 Furthermore, the Panel 
concluded that foreigners own approximately 3% of land in South Africa,65 including: 
residential, agricultural and sectional title property, and that this percentage would be higher 







60 Ibid n39, P22. 
61 Ibid n39, P23. 
62 Ibid n39, P23. 
63 Ibid n39, P21. 
64 Ibid n39, P23. 
65 Ibid n39, P7; Ibid n32.Please note that according to Government’s latest reports this possible figure is still 
considered as below 5%. 
66 Ibid n39, P7. 
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Interestingly, the Panel’s recommendations on regulating foreign ownership did not 
include the explicit prohibition of FOAL.67 They do, however, bear striking resemblances to the 
possible provisions of the RLHB as mentioned in section 1.1. However, the following 
recommendations of the Panel seem to not be part of the proposed RLHB:68 (i) the obtaining of 
special ministerial approval for the disposal of land to foreigners or citizens of certain types of 
land having the potential to negatively impact on land reform; (ii) an outright prohibition69 of 
ownership by foreigners or citizens of land in certain areas based on national interest, 
environmental reasons, areas of historical and cultural significance, and for national security.70 
Examples of such areas included coastal areas, conservation areas, areas close to military 
installations, and along the borders; (ii) a ‘Limited Temporary Moratorium’ of two years on the 
disposal of ‘state land’ by any governmental sphere (including municipalities) to foreigners and 
certain citizens not eligible for redress under land reform policies;71 and (iii) medium to long 
term leases should be allowed of ‘public land’ to provide a form of secure tenure for ‘genuine 
foreign investors’. 
 
The above shows that most of the Panel’s proposals on regulating land ownership were to 
affect not only foreigners, but South Africans as well. Furthermore, their proposal on the 
prohibition of foreign ownership of land seems restricted to state land and classified/protected 
areas. This might be due to: (i) the uncertainty on the actual extent of foreign ownership; and (ii) 
the contra-regulation arguments contained in the Report relating to the economic effects of such 
a prohibition, which will be discussed below.72  
Whilst no formal national policy on the regulation of foreign ownership of land has 
evolved from this Report, however, the idea of regulating foreign ownership has been taken up in 
the Green Paper mentioned above. The Green Paper deals with the topic of foreign ownership of 
land explicitly73 although not explicitly in the context of the prohibition thereof. It seems to be 
                                                                
67 Ibid n39, P37-40. 
68 Ibid n39, P3. 
69 Note that statements on the RLHB refer to such foreign ownership being ‘discouraged’ not banned. 
70 Ibid n39, P41. 
71 Ibid n39, P41. 
72 In Section 19. 
73 Ibid n40, P8. 
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the first legislative development in relation to the regulation of foreign ownership, since 
Government published the Panel Report in 2007.  
From the onset, the Green Paper links the land of South Africa to the principle of ‘national 
sovereignty’ and to the notion that land is a ‘national asset’. 74 According to it, these principles 
are the fundamental start of achieving the objectives of effective land reform, food sovereignty 
and security.75   
 
In doing so, the Green Paper renewed Government’s land reform vision and identified the 
challenges faced in respect of the existing land reform programs at the time of its publication. 
The problem statements relied on included a need to encourage ‘national identity, shared 
citizenship and autonomy-fostering service delivery’76 by way of Government’s continued 
investment in the transformation of systems and patterns of land control and ownership. 
 
Furthermore, the Green Paper identified the weaknesses of the land reform system leading 
to the introduction of the Green Paper at the time,77 which are similar to the ones contained in the 
Panel Report.78 Different to the Panel Report, however, the Green Paper also notes the following 
additional challenges, namely:79 (i) meeting the 30% redistribution target by 2014; (iii) the 
diminishing contribution of agriculture to the GDP; and (iii) unrelenting increases in rural 
unemployment.  
 
To overcome these challenges, the Green Paper sets out the ideal land reform position in 
South Africa80 as one which encapsulates (i) ‘a re-configured single, coherent four-tier system 
of land tenure’ ensuring reasonable access to land for the basic needs of black people; (ii) 
‘clearly defined property rights,’; and (iii) secured long-term land tenure for resident non-
                                                                
74 Ibid n40, P3. 
75 Ibid n40, P1. 
76 Ibid n40, P4. 
77 Ibid n40, P5. 
78 The rest include: the willing-seller-willing-buyer model, concerns about the beneficiary selection and support 
system; land administration. 
79 Ibid n40, P5. 
80 Green Paper on Land Reform, 2011, P4. 
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citizens that partake in investments enhancing food sovereignty, livelihood and improved 
agro-industrial development.   
 
It is in this regard that the foreign owners of land in South Africa becomes relevant 
because the ideal of a single four-tier tenure system, which includes the categories of land rights 
earmarked for land reform,81 includes ‘land owned by foreigners: freehold, but precarious 
tenure, with obligations and conditions to comply with’.82 The other forms of land tenure 
include (a) state and public land; (b) privately owned land: freehold, with limited extent; and (c) 
communally owned land.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the Green Paper makes mention of two instances where land 
rights of foreigners/non-citizens are relevant.  The first instance is as part of a new tenure system 
introduced, and the second instance is in respect of a ‘secure form of long-term land tenure for 
resident non-citizens engaged in appropriate investments.’ The Green Paper, however, does not 
provide any information on how these forms of foreign land tenure rights will contribute to 
resolving the land reform challenges identified.83 In fact, according to property law experts, there 
is disappointment in the way it addresses how the weaknesses identified will be overcome.84  
 
Furthermore, the full extent of how foreign land owners will be affected is unclear.85  For 
example, it is unclear how the word ‘freehold’ is used in relation to the rights foreigners will 
have in respect of land. It has been said that the term could be a different concept to ‘ownership’ 
in the South African legal sense.86 This may therefore either be the use of the wrong word or 
indicate that ownership will vest in the Government.87 Furthermore, it appears per the Green 
Paper that foreign-owned land will be subject to conditions but these are also not clarified.88  
 
                                                                
81 Ibid n80, P6. 
82 Third tier. 
83 JM, Pienaar Land Reform (2014), P239, P243 – 244. 
84 Pienaar op cit, n83, P268 – 269. 
85 Pienaar op cit, n84, P268 – 269. 
86 Pienaar, n83, P244. 
87 Pienaar, n83, P245. 
88 Ibid n40, P6.  
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Finally, the Green Paper was followed by the publication of the Policy Framework as 
referred to earlier in this section. This document is a framework for policy on, for example: (i) 
the setting floor and ceiling levels for agricultural land holdings; and (ii) the disclosure of 
information on use rights in agricultural property. 89 Although the Framework does not deal 
explicitly with the rights of foreign land owners, it does confirm that it applies to the four-tier 
system of land tenure which affects foreigners.90 Interestingly, the document provides that its 
focus is to identify a balanced approach between granting access to land to people from rural 
areas whilst maintaining the ‘positive perception – and reality – that South Africa is an investor-
friendly country’.91 This seems to re-affirm that Government’s land reform policies do take 
cognisance of the rights of foreign investors. 
 
Based on the above, the foremost policy reason for the implementation of the RLHB seems 
to be because land reform, as a critical objective of the Government, needs to be radically 
expedited. For this, it seems that one of the actions identified to achieve this expedition is the 
prohibition of FOAL which drives up market prices of agricultural land required for 
redistribution.92 We turn now to the next key step which is to consider the RLHB’s 
Constitutional background. 
 
b) The Constitutional Background 
As a potential new law, the RLHB requires a Constitutional basis. This is because all laws not 
consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the ‘Constitution’)93 are 
invalid.94  
As a law addressing the land reform and more specifically, the redistribution goal of 





92 SA Government News Agency, Land Holdings Bill to be presented to Cabinet, (2016) available at: 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/land-holdings-bill-be-presented-cabinet accessed on 17 December 2016. 
93 Act No. 108 of 1996. 
94 S2, Constitution. 
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‘property clause’). The property clause aims to achieve a balance95 between two goals, namely: 
(i) protecting existing private property rights against Government’s interference;96 and (ii) 
providing Government with authority to effect its land reform goals in the public interest.97 The 
reformative purpose of the property clause is said to embody, inter alia, the redistribution 
programme of Government in Section 25(5) 98 providing that:  
‘the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources so as to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis….’ 
The wording of Section 25(5) may be interpreted to mean that Government ‘has a general 
duty’ to take reasonable legislative steps with its available resources to, on an equitable basis, 
ensure that citizens have access to land.99 Hereby, the Constitution limits the right of access to 
land for reform purposes, only to citizens. However, this government obligation needs to be in 
balance with existing property rights,100 and this should include those of foreigners. Existing 
property rights of foreigners are protected by, for example, Section 25(1) from being unlawfully 
deprived.101 Reading Section 25(5) together with Section 25(8) furthermore, makes it clear, 
however, that no part of Section 25 may ‘impede the state from taking legislative measures to 
achieve…land reform…to address the results of the past racial discrimination’ provided – ‘that 
any departure of this section is in line with … s 36(1).’ It has been said that Section 36 of the 
Constitution aims to find a balance between individual and public interests.102 This indicates that 
foreign land owners may have recourse to the South African Constitutional Court in the event of 
being unlawfully deprived of their property rights. This discussion, however, falls outside the 
ambit of this thesis which focusses on lawfulness in the International Law context.  







99 Ibid n83, P183. 
100 Ibid n83, P185. 




1.3 Possible Economic Consequences  
In order to ultimately determine whether, and in what way, the enactment of the RLHB may lead 
to South Africa being held accountable by its GATS and BIT partners for the violation of its 
commitments and obligations, this section briefly focusses on the probable economic outcome of 
the RLHB.   
In my view, it is to be expected that the promulgation of the RLHB may negatively impact 
on the South African economy. In fact, this was the main argument raised against the regulation 
of foreign ownership of land when Government first investigated the notion.103 Some contra-
arguments vis a vis the regulation of foreign ownership of land in the abovementioned Panel 
Report, were that:104 (i) government interference in the free market for land would ‘discourage 
investor confidence’; (ii) it would violate South Africa BITs; (iii) FDI supports economic growth 
and leads to job creation and should not be discouraged; and (iv) the opportunity costs of using 
land for agricultural purposes dictate that it should be used for alternative purposes. 
Today, the most prevalent criticism against the promulgation of the RLHB is still driven by 
the fear of it discouraging FDI into South Africa.105 This was also recently confirmed by the 
Minister when he stated that the prohibition of FOAL was mainly ‘outright rejected’ by the 
major part of the agricultural sector and the Banking Association of South Africa on the basis of 
it deterring foreign investment impacting the entire economy.106 However, to this the Minister 
responded that: 
‘…We certainly do not agree with this view. Our conviction is that any investor, whether 
foreign or national, wants policy certainty. Once they understand what the policy is, they 
adapt accordingly….’107  
Nevertheless, the importance of FDI for the economy can be seen, for example, in the 




105 SA Commercial Property News, ‘Nedbank’s view on proposed bill to block land sales to foreigners’ (2014), 
available at: http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/property-investment/6913-nedbank-view-on-proposed-bill-to-





for FDI worldwide and showed that South Africa’s FDI made up 42% of its total GDP.108 One 
reason given recently for South Africa’s openness to FDI is because it does not have foreign 
ownership restrictions on property.109 Furthermore, recently the Government has emphasised the 
pivotal role which attracting FDI in South Africa plays and the message is generally sent that 
South Africa is ‘open for business’.110 However, South Africa recently saw a decline in FDI 
flows based on UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, and some economist have said, this can 
be attributed to the country’s changed foreign investment policy and its uncertain land reform 
policy proposals. 111 
A reduction in FDI has been the experience of other countries imposing foreign ownership 
restrictions such as Brazil where media reports have recently indicated concerns about FDI 
reduction as a result thereof.112 Brazil113 in 2010 instituted ‘an effective prohibition on selling 
land to foreign individuals and companies’.114 The reasons given for why the prohibition should 
be uplifted relating to FDI were because:115 (i) such prohibition resulted in economic and legal 
challenges; (ii) experience showed that all agricultural areas stood to ‘gain from easing the ban’ 
as entities refused to invest in land in which they had ‘no legal rights’; (iii) the agricultural 
ministry emphasised the need for attracting investments in the agribusiness; (iv) a ‘bigger 
presence of foreign investors’ could lead to higher productivity; and (v) a need existed for the 
agricultural market to be as ‘open’ as possible to foreign investors.  
                                                                
108 SA Government, ‘President Jacob Zuma on importance of Foreign Direct Investment’ (2015), available at: 
http://www.gov.za/speeches/south-africa-recognises-importance-foreign-direct-investment-president-zuma-11-nov-
2015, accessed on 30 January 2017. 
109 Export.gov, ‘South Africa - Openness to and Restriction on Foreign Investment’, (2016), available at: 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=South-Africa-openness-to-foreign-investment, accessed on 25 January 2017. 
110 Rob Davies, ‘SA economy still attractive for investment’ (2016) http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/business/sa-
economy-still-attractive-for-investment-2073613, accessed on 10 March 2017. 
111 Lynnley Donnelly, SA takes foreign direct investment hit (2015) https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-25-sa-takes-
foreign-direct-investment-hit, accessed on 10 March 2017. 
112 Paraguassu Lisandra, “Brazil to lift limits on foreigners’ owning of land” (2016): Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-privatization-franco-idUSKCN0YG2PG, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
113 Brazil incidentally was one of the countries that the Government visited as part of the compiling of the Panel 





Furthermore, it has been said that international trade and investment are ‘complementary’ 
in serving foreign markets.116 One way in which they complement each other is on a multilateral 
level under the GATS’ ‘commercial presence’ mode of supply in terms of which - FDI is seen as 
the required method for exporting various services.117  This mode of service supply will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 below but for purposes of this section, it must be understood that FDI 
directly impacts on many foreign services suppliers requiring a physical presence in South 
Africa, which they achieve by acquiring their own property or assets. Consequently, a reduction 
in FDI relating to foreign services providers will probably affect trade in services involving 
agricultural land. It is the author’s view that the significance of such a reduction in services will, 
however, depend on the actual foreign investment in agricultural land by foreign services 
suppliers. The importance of trade in services can also be seen in the OECD’s report as 
mentioned above for 2016. It appears that services account for 14% of the GDP at the moment, 
whilst it accounts for 47% of the country’s ‘exports in value added terms’ which shows that the 
country’s goods exported depend heavily on services inputs.118 
Precise statistics on foreign ownership of land is not available in South Africa, because the 
Deeds Registry system in South Africa does not make provision for the recording of sufficient 
data.119 As seen above, Government reports over the years, have indicated, however, that 
approximately 3% of South African land is foreign owned.120 Whether the RLHB is necessary 
for purposes of land reform remains to be seen as academic reports show it is not, because the 
significance of FOAL is not material.121  
It is accordingly the author’s view that the Government needs to consciously balance the 
potential loss of trade and investment confidence which will negatively impact on the country’s 
economic growth due to the introduction of the RLHB - against the real benefits it will reap in 
                                                                
116 WTO website, ‘Trade and foreign direct investment’ (1996) available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm, accessed on 25 January 2017. 
117 Ibid. 
118 OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): South Africa, (2016), second page, available here: 
http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/STRI_ZAF.pdf, accessed on 26 January 2017. 
119 The Panel of Experts on the Development of Policy regarding Land Ownership by Foreigners in South Africa, 
represented by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs at the time, Hon. Lulu Xingwana, ‘Report and 
Recommendations’ (2007), available at: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Foreign-land-
owners/PLOF_Report.pdf, pages 20-27. 
120 Ibid note 11, Pages 20-21. 
121 Ibid note 11 , Pages 14-16; Pages 20-27.  
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terms of land reform laws involving the total ban on FOAL. In addition, the benefits of FDI in 
South Africa should not be underestimated as it has been said to support: job creation and local 
spending on goods and services.122  
 We turn now to the potential legal effects of the RLHB in relation to trade and investment. 
                                                                
122 Masipa Tshepo, ‘The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth and Employment in South 
Africa: A Time Series Analysis’, (2014), Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, 





Will the promulgation of the RLHB be in Violation of South 
Africa’s General Obligations and Special Commitments under 
the GATS? 
 
As seen above, it seems the RLHB will aim to remedy, as part of South Africa’s general legal 
reform agenda, the injustices of the past by preventing more land being owned by foreigners. 
The Bill is also to assist Government in reaching its land reform goals sooner as the country’s 
land reform programme is still in a state of flux. 
Considering that the RLHB will probably affect foreign direct investment, international 
trade in services and the operation of foreign services providers in South Africa,123 this Chapter 
aims to investigate if the promulgation thereof may be in conflict with South Africa’s GATS 
obligations and commitments. These obligations and commitments should, in the author’s view, 
be considered because they directly affect the roles of WTO Members, such as South Africa, in 
regulating trade and investment in services.124 GATS restricts, to a certain extent, the rights of 
the South African Government to make its own domestic policies and laws affecting foreign 
service sectors, as it does with the governments of all WTO Members.125 
It must be noted therefore that the RLHB might draw the attention of South Africa’s 
service trading partners who already own land or who intend to own land in the country. The 
ideas shared in this thesis may be of interest to South Africa’s legal profession when it is 
consulted to comment on the possible International Trade Law implications of the RLHB when it 
is tabled in Parliament for comment.  
                                                                
123 Ibid n116. 
124 Annex 1B of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
125 Cottier et al, P2. 
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In what follows, the South African GATS commitments and obligations will be considered 
more closely to show why South Africa will probably contravene some of its commitments and 
obligations by promulgating the RLHB and what the possible consequences thereof will be.  
 
2.1 The Relevance of the GATS for South Africa  
 
As a WTO Agreement, the GATS was introduced during the Uruguay Round in the year 1995 as 
a multilateral agreement governing international trade in all services. 126   
 
As an original WTO Member, South Africa, like all other 162 members, automatically 
became bound by and assumed general obligations and specific commitments under the GATS in 
individual service sectors due to the ‘single undertaking rule’.127 The latter rule implies that 
South Africa could not elect whether or not it wanted to sign-up to the GATS.128 Similar to its 
counterpart for trade in goods, namely the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’), 
the GATS aims to ensure, in relation to international trade in services, the promotion of: 129  (i) a 
system of dependable international trade rules; (ii) non-discrimination, fair and equitable 
treatment of all participants; (iii) economic activity through guaranteed policy bindings; and (iv) 
trade and development through progressive liberalisation.  
  
In order to achieve this all Members had to, apart from general obligations as contained in 
the GATS’ text, also bound itself to a set of variable specific commitments in respect of the 
specific services sectors which they committed to international trade, and South Africa was no 
exception.130 South Africa’s specific commitments are contained in its Schedules of 
Commitments and, with the exclusion of a few service sectors, South Africa committed to fully 
                                                                
126 GATS Preamble, second sentence. 
127 WTO website, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines’ 
available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm, accessed on 01 December 2016. 
128 WTO Website, ‘How the negotiations are organized’ available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm, accessed 21 January 2017. 
129 Ibid note 127. 
130 Ibid note 18 and as per South Africa’s trade profile on the WTO website, ‘South Africa and the WTO’ available 
at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/south_africa_e.htm, accessed on 1 December 2016. 
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opening its markets to international trade in most services.131 These commitments will be looked 
at more closely in relation to the RLHB below when analysing if South Africa will be in 
violation of any of them by implementing the RLHB.   
 
The commitments, however, should be understood in light of the purpose of the GATS132 
and the reasons why South Africa is a contracting state to the GATS.  The Agreement aims to 
grow international commerce and promote ‘progressive liberalization’ of trade in services to 
promote economic growth for all trading partners and for the development of developing 
countries.133 At the same time, the Agreement nevertheless, recognises Members’ rights to 
introduce new domestic regulations affecting the supply of services to meet national policy 
objectives, and especially the need for developing countries to do so.134  
 
By opening up most of its services sectors to international trade for the promotion of 
economic growth, South Africa has therefore bound most of its services sectors to general and 
specific GATS commitments and obligations. Accordingly, if the country wishes to introduce 
new domestic laws affecting trade in services, such as the RLHB, the laws must be in line with 
these commitments and obligations. Alternatively, South Africa will have to show that such laws 
are introduced for national policy purposes.135 
 
Based on the Preamble of the GATS there seems to be tension between the purpose of the 
GATS, which is the desire to provide a framework of rules preventing trade protectionism and 
the recognition that developing countries should still be allowed to regulate the supply of 
services in their quest to meet national policy objectives. This tension will be amongst the 
themes to be discussed towards the end of this Chapter in relation to the GATS’ general 
exceptions.  
I commence the investigation if South Africa will comply with its GATS General 
Obligations and Specific Commitments, by determining if the RLHB falls within the ambit of the 
                                                                
131 GATS Preamble. 
132 As set out in the GATS Preamble. 
133 Ibid n131. 
134 Ibid n127. 
135 GATS Preamble.  
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GATS.  This is because any measure affecting services trade implemented by a WTO Member 
may only be challenged by another WTO Member before the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO (the ‘DSB’) if the GATS applies to it.136 
It is the author’s view that the GATS is applicable to the RLHB, based on the following 
analysis:  
The scope of the GATS 
Article I:1 of the GATS provides that this Agreement applies to (i) ‘measures by Members’ 
affecting (ii) ‘trade in services’.137 In terms of Article I:3 ‘measures by Members’ constitute 
those taken by any sphere of government and may even involve measures taken through 
delegated authority.138 
A ‘measure’ is further defined in terms of Article XXVIII(a) as ‘any measure by a 
Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative 
action, or any other form.’ This definition must be read with Article XXVIII(c), which limits the 
application of the GATS to those laws, regulations, etc., ‘affecting trade in services’.  
 
Trade in services are defined as the supply of services (e.g. production, distribution, etc.)139 
through one of the following means: 140 
‘ … 
(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service; 
(ii) the access to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services 
which are required by those Members to be offered to the public generally; 
(iii) the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the 
supply of a service in the territory of another Member;’ [Emphasis added.] 
Accordingly, in order for the RLHB to qualify as a measure for GATS purposes, it must 
affect the supply of services delivered through one of the ways as set out in the quoted definition 
of measures ‘affecting trade in services’ above.141   
                                                                
136 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P560. 
137 Ibid n136. 
138 Article I:3,GATS. 
139 Article XXVII(b), GATS. 
140 Article XXVIII(c); For a discussion see Ibid n136, P564-565. 
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The question therefore is whether the prohibition of FOAL will affect foreign services 
providers’ abilities to provide their services in South Africa through one of the abovementioned 
ways.  
What affects trade in services has been interpreted broadly in the past by the Appellate 
Body (the ‘AB’). In the EC-Bananas III case, for instance, 142 the AB had to decide, if new 
licence rules for the importation of bananas violated the Most Favoured Nation principle in terms 
of the GATS, as it treated some service suppliers more favourably than others. The AB found 
that the import licences constituted ‘measures’ under the GATS because it affected services 
trade. The reason given was because the “ordinary meaning of the word ‘affecting’” in Article 
I:1 must be interpreted broadly to mean any measure that has ‘an effect on’ trade in services.143 
The AB also confirmed that ‘services’ in Article I:1 should be interpreted broadly in terms of the 
definition of services under Article I:3(b) which refers to ‘any’ service in ‘any’ sector except 
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.144 The latter services refer to all 
those services that are not supplied commercially or in competition with one or more service 
suppliers.145 
Accordingly, if it can be shown that the promulgation of the RLHB will in any way affect 
foreign services providers’ capacity to supply their services in South Africa – this potential new 
law must comply with the GATS. It is the author’s view that this is the case because it will 
prevent those WTO Members mainly interested or reliant on owning agricultural land - from 
establishing a commercial presence146 in the territory of South Africa from where they can 
supply their services.147  
In addition, this broad interpretation of measures ‘affecting’ services has been said to imply 
that if a measure changes the ‘conditions of competition’148 between suppliers of services then it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
141 Article XXVIII(c); For a discussion see Ibid n136, P564-565. 
142 AB Report, EC – Bananas III case, Para.220. 
143 AB Report, EC – Bananas III case, Para.74. 
144 Article I:3(b) of the GATS. 
145 Article I:3(c) of the GATS. 
146 This concept will be looked at more closely below at s2.2.2. It includes: (i) ‘the creation or maintenance of a 
branch or a representative office…’ in another’s territory. Article XXVIII(d)(ii). 
147 Article XXVIII(c)(iii). 
148 Panel Decision in EC – Bananas III case, Para.7.281. 
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affects trade in services. In the context of the National Treatment commitments,149 for example, 
it implies that if implementing the RLHB will affect the competition between service providers 
from different WTO Member countries operating in South Africa and South African service 
providers, the measure would fall under the ambit of the GATS.  By allowing only nationals to 
forthwith acquire agricultural land, it can be argued that South African service providers 
operating from agricultural land are favoured over foreigners competing with them.  
Based on this, the RLHB will constitute a measure for GATS purposes as it will affect 
those foreign services suppliers intending to establish a commercial presence here to supply their 
services on agricultural land. Whether this measure is lawful under the GATS, is what we turn to 
next. 
 
2.2  The Lawfulness of the Proposed Regulation of Land Holdings Bill 
under the GATS  
The GATS, which applies to trade in all services, is supported by three pillars consisting of (i) 
general obligations; (ii) annexes relating to sector specific rules; and (iii) schedules of 
commitments by WTO Members. These pillars will be looked at below when determining the 
lawfulness of the promulgation of the RLHB. In order to be lawful, the implementation of this 
potential new law may not contravene South Africa’s GATS: (i) General Obligations; or (ii) 
Specific Commitments.  
 My study on the lawfulness of the RLHB under the GATS will, however, mainly focus 
on South Africa’s Specific Commitments which, in my view, are likely to be contravened by the 
promulgation of the RLHB. Furthermore, I am of the view that the RLHB on promulgation may 
be in line with the country’s general obligations as explained directly below.  
 
                                                                
149 Ibid n127. 
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2.2.1 Promulgation of the RLHB is likely to comply with SA’s Main General 
GATS Obligations  
The general obligations under the GATS are those provisions which WTO Members have to take 
on and150 respect in full.151 These obligations can be divided into unconditional and conditional 
obligations.152 Unconditional obligations are those which all Members have to abide by, 
regardless of the existence of specific commitments and include, for example, two vital 
obligations:153 the Most Favoured Nation (‘MFN’) treatment principle (per Article II); and Basic 
Transparency (per Article III). 
 
The reasons why the promulgation of the RLHB may be in line with these two obligations 
are the following: 
 
(a) In respect of the MFN Treatment Obligation: 
 
This general obligation is provided for in Article II.1 of the GATS as follows:   
 
‘With respect to any measure covered in this Agreement, each member shall accord immediately 
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member no less favourable 
treatment that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country’ [emphasis 
added]. 
 
In providing for equal treatment amongst WTO Members154 this obligation provides that a 
WTO Member country may not favour any other country’s services or service suppliers 
(including those of WTO Members) over another WTO Member country,155 except if a Member 
                                                                
150 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P567.  
151 WTO Trade in services division, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services, An Introduction’, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gsintr_e.pdf, (2013) P6, accessed on 20 November 2016. 
152 Ibid n150. 
153 WTO E-Learning ‘Introduction to Trade in Services in the WTO’ (2014) available at: 
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_627/CourseContents/GATS-R8-E-Print.pdf, at Page 101, accessed on 
20 November 2016. 
154 WTO E-Learning ‘Introduction to Trade in Services in the WTO’ (2014) available at: 
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_627/CourseContents/GATS-R8-E-Print.pdf, at Page 102, accessed on 
20 November 2016. 
155 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P569. 
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provided for MFN exceptions.156 Furthermore, should there be any such favouritism, the same 
favour must immediately be extended to all other WTO Members in an automatic fashion and 
without further conditions being imposed. 157  
Based on the above interpretation of the MFN treatment obligation, the author’s view is 
that the MFN treatment obligation will not be affected by the promulgation of the RLHB. This is 
simply because the prohibition of FOAL will probably apply equally to all foreigners and 
therefore to all services providers in other WTO Member countries. It has been said this principle 
aims to prevent abrasions and distortions due to ‘power-based (bilateral) policies’ and ensures 
that trading rights do not depend on a single Member’s political and economic influence.158 These 
aims cannot therefore be applicable to the implementation of domestic laws, like the RLHB, 
which aims to benefit only itself and no other WTO Member.  
(b) In respect of the Basic Transparency Obligation: 
 
This general obligation of WTO Members seems especially relevant now considering the talks of 
the RLHB being introduced in the near future.  Transparency is guaranteed to WTO Members in 
Article III of the GATS which provides, inter alia, that each Member must: 
 
(i)   Publish all relevant measures of general application affecting the operation of the GATS 
– promptly and at the latest upon entry into force; 159 
(ii)   Make publicly available any such information if publication is impracticable ;160  
(iii) Promptly or annually inform the Council for Trade in Services of the introduction of any 
new, or changes to existing laws, regulations and administrative guidelines possibly 
significantly affecting trade in services covered by specific commitments ;161 and 
(iv) Be open to requests for further information by other WTO members regarding the 
RLHB.162 
                                                                
156 Article II:2 of the GATS. 
157 Article II:1 as discussed in Matsushita et al, Page 619 and Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, Page 571. 
158 WTO Website, ‘Gats Training Module: Chapter 1, Basic Purpose and Concepts’, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s6p1_e.htm, accessed on 14 January 2017. 
159 Article III:1, GATS. 
160 Article III:2, GATS. 
161 Article III:3, GATS. 
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In respect of South Africa’s responsibility in terms of Article III:3 towards the WTO, my 
research revealed that South Africa has recently informed the WTO of its trade policies on goods 
and services by the publication of the ‘Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union 
(Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa and Lesotho)’.163 This document lists South 
Africa’s trade policies by sector and by measure which seem to relate to trade in goods and 
services.  An overview of this document did not reveal any policy changes regarding the 
restriction of FOAL. Should South Africa wish to implement the RLHB, it will therefore it 
seems, have to update this Trade Policy Review or inform the WTO otherwise. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of the Bill seems widely publicised in South Africa already and the Government has 
been fairly open about this possibility in its official announcements and publications164 and 
therefore its Transparency obligation seems complied with.  
 
2.2.2 Promulgation of the RLHB is Likely to Violate SA’s Specific GATS 
Commitments  
 
2.2.2.1 Background to SA’s Specific Commitments 
In addition to the general obligations which South Africa has in common with other WTO 
Members under the GATS, the country also undertook certain separate sector-specific 
commitments when the Agreement entered into force in 1995.165 These commitments emerged as 
soon as the Government agreed to include particular commitments in relation to the service 
sectors it dedicated to international trade, in South Africa’s Schedule of Commitments (the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
162 Article III:5, GATS. 
163 Annex 4, South Africa, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s324-03_e.pdf, Pages 280 - 359. 
164 Ibid n1&2. 
165 Member Information, ‘South Africa and the WTO’, available at: 
(https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/south_africa_e.htm, accessed on 13 January 2017. 
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‘GATS Schedule’).  As such, these commitments are binding on the Government unless and 
until they are modified or withdrawn, which is a complex process and will be discussed below.166 
South Africa’s specific commitments in favour of foreign services from other WTO 
Member countries, as with other WTO members, are: the Market Access Commitments167, the 
National Treatment Commitments168 and the Additional Commitments169 (the ‘Specific 
Commitments’).170 This means that South Africa categorised its commitments per service sector 
and per Specific Commitment in its GATS Schedule. This literally entails the Schedule listing all 
service sectors committed by South Africa in column format opposite the headings: Market 
Access, National Treatment and Additional Commitments.171  
Other than the GATS General Obligations, the Specific Commitments only bind those 
service sectors included in a Member’s schedule of commitments.172 In other words, only those 
services pertinently dedicated by Government to trade in terms of the GATS Schedule, can 
benefit from the Market Access and National Treatment Commitments.173  
The list of service sectors which South Africa committed to the GATS174 has been 
described as ‘fairly extensive’ for a developing country because other developing countries have 
taken a more restricted approach.175 This is because South Africa included most of its service 
sectors to international trade in its GATS Schedule without many restrictions, and excluded only 
                                                                
166 WTO Website, ‘Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments and the list of article II (MFN) 
exemptions’, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm, accessed on 13 January 2017. 
167 Article XVI, GATS. 
168 Article XVII, GATS. 
169 Article XVIII, GATS. 
170 Matsushita et al, Page 641. 
171 Ibid note 170. 
172 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P591. 
173 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P585. 
174 The service sectors for which South Africa scheduled specific commitments in the GATS Schedule, as generally 
contained in most schedules of commitments of WTO Members, include: Business services (including for example, 
legal, auditing, taxation, architectural, engineering, medical and dental services); Computer Services; Real estate 
services involving own or leased property; Rental/leasing services; Construction and related services; Environmental 
services (including for example: storage services, refuse disposal and sanitation); Financial services (including for 
example: all insurance services, banking and other financial services); Tourism and travel related services (including 
for example: hotels and restaurants, travel agencies, tour operator services and tourist guide services); Courier 
service; Telecommunication Services; Transport Services; Distribution services (including for example: wholesale 
trade, retailing services and franchising) and; Others. 
175 Scott Sinclair, ‘The GATS, South African local governments and water services’ (2005), Available at: 
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2005/brief6_2.pdf, 
at Page 2, accessed 20 November 2016. 
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a few governmental services from the Schedule. Despite this, there are suggestions that South 
Africa has been requested by other WTO Members such as the European Union and the United 
States to commit more services to its GATS Schedule especially energy,176  water and sanitation 
services.177   
Where any of the service sectors are made subject to conditions imposed by the 
Government affecting any of the Specific Commitments, such conditions are inserted under the 
relevant Commitment’s heading. The Specific Commitments contained in the GATS Schedule 
furthermore, can be divided in both horizontal and sector-specific commitments which may be 
different per mode of service supply.178 Horizontal commitments are the restrictions listed per 
mode of supply in the Schedule that are applicable to all service sectors contained therein, unless 
specified otherwise.179 Sector-specific commitments are those restrictions included per specific 
service sector and mode of supply and do not apply to all sectors.180  
Furthermore, each of the service sectors contained in the schedules of commitments of all 
WTO Members are divided into four modes of supply.181These include:  (i) Mode 1: cross 
border supply – services supplied from one country to another (for example: international 
satellite television where the service provider and the consumer are in different countries); (ii) 
Mode 2: consumption abroad – consumers or firms make use of a service in another country 
(for example: tourism where the consumer goes abroad, to where the service provider is 
situated); (iii) Mode 3: commercial presence: a service provider from one country establishes a 
‘commercial presence’ in the host country where the service is provided. This has also been 
described as when a service provider of a WTO Member launches a ‘territorial presence’, by, 
for instance, owning or leasing a business in the area of another WTO Member for services 
                                                                
176 Ian Steuart, ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services in South Africa: The Multilateral Dimension’, (2005), Human 
Sciences Research Council, School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, available at: 
https://www.gtac.gov.za/Research%20Repository/Liberalisation%20Trade%20in%20Services%20in%20South%20
Africa%20%20The%20Multilateral%20Dimension.pdf, Page 26, accessed on 15 January 2017. 
177 Ibid n175, P8. 
178 Petros C. Mavroidis & Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Documents, Cases & 
Analys’ (2013) 2nd Ed, Page 780; WTO Guidelines For The Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), (2001), P9. 
179 Matsushita et al, 3rd Ed, P591. 
180 Ibid n179. 
181 Article I.2, GATS. 
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provided (for example: domestic subsidiaries of hotel chains);182 and (iv) Mode 4: presence of 
natural persons – individuals travel from their own country to supply services in another 
country (for example: models or consultants). 
These modes of supply are relevant because an enquiry into whether the promulgation of 
the  RLHB violates any of South Africa’s specific commitments as contained in the GATS 
Schedule, requires an understanding of which mode of supply will be impacted by the RLHB’s 
promulgation. This is because the RLHB might not affect all modes of supply as not all foreign 
services providers interested to trade in South Africa intend to acquire ownership of agricultural 
land here for the supply of their services.  
Examples of WTO Members who have entered land ownership restrictions in their GATS 
Schedules include: Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia.183 Generally, it seems that the kind of 
land acquisition restrictions amongst these countries vary between simply requiring the reporting 
of the acquisition of foreign ownership and those countries that outright ban foreign ownership 
of land.184 The following extracts taken from Indonesia’s and Thailand’s GATS schedules 
illustrate how these countries have formulated, among others, their land ownership restrictions in 
their schedules.185  
Note how these restrictions which are highlighted in bold below, are inserted under the 
horizontal commitments in either in the Market Access and National Treatment column and 




182 WTO Website, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines’, 
available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm, accessed on 4 December 2016. 
183 Richard Ming Kirk Tan, ‘Restrictions on the foreign ownership of property Indonesia and Singapore compared’ 
(2004), Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 22 Iss 1 pp. 101 – 111, Page 102, available at: 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/14635780410525162, accessed on 13 January 2017. 
184 Ibid n183. 
185 Available online at: http://www.esf.be/pdfs/GATS%20UR%20Commitments/Indonesia%20SoC.pdf for 
Indonesia and at: http://www.esf.be/pdfs/GATS%20UR%20Commitments/Thailand%20-
%20UR%20Schedule%20of%20Commitments.pdf, for Thailand, accessed on 13 January 2017. 
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A. Table: 1 Indonesia’s horizontal commitments in respect of land ownership restrictions 
INDONESIA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons 
Sector or subsector   Limitations on market 
access   











 ii) not more than 49% of 
the capital share of the 
Limited Liability 
Enterprise (Perseroan 
Terbatas/PT), may be 






 ii) not more than 49% of 
the capital share of the 
Limited Liability 
Enterprise (Perseroan 
Terbatas/PT), may be 
owned by foreign 
partner(s).  
3)… 
 Land Acquisition 
Undang-Undang Pokok 
Agraria (Land Law) No. 
5 of 1960 stipulates that 
no foreigners (juridical 
and natural persons) are
allowed to own land.  
However, a joint 
venture enterprise could 
hold the right for land 
use (Hak Guna Usaha) 
and building rights 




and they may rent/lease 




B. Table: 2 – Thailand’s horizontal commitments in respect of land ownership restrictions 
THAILAND - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons 
Sector or subsector   Limitations on market 
access   










3), 4) Regarding 
acquisition and usage of 
land according to the 
Land Code of Thailand, 
foreign nationals or 
domestic companies 
which are deemed 
foreigners are not 
allowed to purchase or 
own land in Thailand.  
However, they may lease
land and own buildings.  
Foreigners are also 
allowed to own part of 
condominium units 
under the laws and 
3)Unless otherwise 
specified, national 
treatment for this mode of 






the ownership of 
condominiums. 
 
The next section of this Chapter will look more closely at South Africa’s Specific 
Commitments horizontally and sector-specifically in relation to the commercial presence mode 
of supply (Mode 3) alongside the RLHB. 
2.2.3 How the RLHB May be in Conflict with SA’s Specific GATS 
Commitments once Promulgated 
Having seen how land ownership restrictions are usually incorporated in GATS schedules of 
specific commitments, this section will determine if the promulgation of the RLHB will be in 
compliance with South Africa’s Specific Commitments of Market Access and National 
Treatment. 
When weighing-up the RLHB against the GATS Schedule, a closer inspection of the 
GATS Schedule is necessary. This is because in order for the Bill to be lawful in terms of the 
Specific Commitments, its content must comply with the promises which South Africa made in 
its GATS Schedule.186 For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will, however, be on the 
country’s Market Access and National Treatment Commitments in relation to services involving 
Mode 3 suppliers only. As mentioned before, these relate to when service providers of other 
WTO Member countries wish to establish a commercial presence in the territory of South Africa 
by investing, for example, in immovable property here.  
 
In this regard, a ‘Commercial Presence’ is defined in terms of Article XXVIII(d) of the GATS as 
follows: 
‘… (d)“commercial presence” means any type of business or professional establishment, including 
through 
                                                                
186 Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS. 
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(i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or 
(ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, 
                   within the territory of a Member for the purpose of supplying a service;…’ 
 
 
Furthermore, what is meant by a ‘juridical person’ can be found in Article XXVIII(n) of the 
GATS which provides that it means: 
‘… 
(i) “owned” by persons of a Member if more than 50 per cent of the equity interest in it is 
beneficially owned by persons of that Member; 
(ii) “controlled” by persons of a Member if such persons have the power to name a majority 
of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; 
(iii) “affiliated” with another person when it controls, or is controlled by, that other 
person;  or when it and the other person are both controlled by the same person;’ 
 
As mentioned above,187 the RLHB will prohibit ownership in agricultural land by foreign 
nationals (individuals) and by juristic persons when the majority of its shares are foreign owned 
or controlled. This description of foreign owned entities that will be prohibited from owning 
agricultural land relate to the way in which juridical persons may establish a commercial 
presence in terms of the GATS as set out above. Under Article XXVIII(n)(ii), obtaining a 
commercial presence may involve the obtaining of a majority shareholding in a land-owning 
company. Furthermore, Article XXVIII(d)(i) provides that establishing a commercial presence 
includes owning the majority shareholding in a ‘business or professional establishment’ in 
another WTO Member country. The result of purchasing shares in a foreign business usually 
entails the acquisition of the business and its property, including immovable property. The 
GATS definition of commercial presence therefore envisages that the acquisition of a 
commercial presence may entail, acquiring ownership of immovable property. This therefore 
suggests that the RLHB, once promulgated, will prohibit the future establishment of commercial 
presence by those foreign services providers intending to own agricultural land for such purposes 





In this regard, it has been expressly said that the regulation of foreign land acquisition will 
affect and fall within the ambit of the commercial presence mode of supply.188 It is essential to 
note though that a service provider can obtain a commercial presence in a number of ways 
including: the acquisition; leasing or other ways of access to land.189 Therefore, since the RLHB 
will probably allow the leasing of agricultural land by foreigners, it does not per se prohibit the 
establishment of a commercial presence on agricultural land. 190 The promulgation of the RLHB 
will therefore not affect those foreigners intending to lease agricultural land, but merely those 
who want to obtain ownership rights or controlling interests in entities owning agricultural land. 
The focus group of foreign services providers to which this thesis applies is accordingly those 
intending to acquire ownership of agricultural land in South Africa. 
Examples of the service sectors191 that might be impacted by the promulgation of the 
RLHB may include: 
1. Tourism services 
In 2016 the tourism industry was said to play a vital role in South Africa as it contributed to 9% 
of the GDP.192 Various foreign tourism service providers such as hotel chains, restaurants, game 
and wine estates have opened their doors on South African farms.193 Examples of these include 
various prestigious wine farms such: Delaire Graff Estate which is owned by Laurence Graff 194 
and recently, Sir Richard Branson acquired the in Mont Rochelle wine farm in Franschhoek.195 
                                                                
188 Matsushita et al, Page 591; WTO E-learning, ‘Detailed Presentation of Scheduling Specific Commitments in 
Trade in Services’, available at: https://ecampus.wto.org/.../GATS_Sch-L2-R1-E.doc , Page 17 accessed on 13 
January 2017. 
189 WTO Website, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines’ 
available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm, accessed on 21 January 2017. 
190 The President has been quiet on whether foreigners will be eligible for short term leases of agricultural land. 
191 Ibid n174. 
192 Brand South Africa, ‘South Africa exceeds foreign investment target by R20-billion’ (2016), 
https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/investments-immigration/business/trends/global/fdi-increase-040316. 
193 Nick Hedley, ‘Marriott brings its brands to South Africa’s Hospitality Market’ (2014) available at: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/transport/2014/04/24/marriott-brings-its-brands-to-sas-hotel-market. 
194 http://www.delaire.co.za/. 




By banning FOAL the services offered by foreign hotels,196 restaurants and wine farms – 
interested only in owning as opposed to leasing agricultural land - will be prevented from 
entering our tourism market. In addition, existing foreign owners will be restricted to selling their 
farms willing South African buyers. From the policy background of the RLHB and from media 
reports, however, is seems that Government is targeting foreign agricultural land ownership 
relating to the tourism sector by its promulgation.197  
The GATS Schedule shows that South Africa’s GATS Specific commitments for the 
tourism sector are fully liberalised in respect of the commercial presence mode of supply. This is 
because it contains no commercial presence limitations horizontally or specifically in relation to 
the tourism sector vis a vis ownership of agricultural land.198 WTO members in the tourism 
industry are therefore currently free to open branches on agricultural property which they may 
own. As will be seen below, there are various reasons why foreign investors would rather own 
land.199 
2. Construction Services: 
Another sector which does not only involve agricultural land, but all land in general, relate to 
those construction services involving property developers seeking to develop large portions of 
land for residential, commercial and other purposes. Examples of such developments refer to 
residential estates, golf estates, holiday resorts, commercial developments, etc.  
 
3.  Manufacturing Services: 
Here I refer to those services conducted on farms owned and run by foreigners involving the   
production of goods such as dairy products, leather products, etc.  
 
                                                                
196 For a list of various tourism services as classified by Statistics South Africa please view: “Draft Tourism Satellite 
Account for South Africa”, (2009), available at: http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/limiting-foreign-land-
ownership-international-practice, at Page 47. 
197 Press Statement by the Parliament of South Africa; President Jacob Zuma: Response to Debate on the State of the 
Nation Address, dated 18 February 2016; available at: 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=8705&Revision=en/82&SearchStart=0; and at 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/limiting-foreign-land-ownership-international-practice. 
198 South Africa’s Schedule of Commitments, at Page 16. 
199 See page 48 of this Dissertation under Paragraph iv.c. 
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 Finally, on inspection of South Africa’s GATS Schedule,200 it appears that there are no 
restrictions on its ‘commercial presence’ commitments specifically relating to the ownership of 
land in general, let alone agricultural land, under both its horizontal and its sector-specific 
commitments – for any of its dedicated service sectors. Similarly, no reference is made to any 
restrictions on land ownership under the sector-specific commitments which mostly reflect the 
word ‘None’201 for Mode 3 supplies of services listed per Specific Commitment and in any 
event, none of the commercial presence commitments relate to land as can been seen from the 
below extract: 
 
C. Figure: 3 – South Africa’s horizontal commitments indicate no land ownership 
restrictions 
SOUTH AFRICA - SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural
persons 
I. HORIZONTAL COMMITMENTS 
Sector or subsector   Limitations on market 
access   





INCLUDED  IN 
THIS SCHEDULE 
4)Unbound, except for the
temporary presence for a 
period of up to three 
years, unless otherwise 
specified, without 
requiring compliance with
an economic needs test, of
the following categories 
of natural persons 
providing services:  
 ……. 
3)Local borrowing by 
South African registered 
companies with a non-
resident shareholding of 







200 Available here: http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/12/South-Africa-GATS-Schedule-of-Commitments.pdf, 
accessed on 13 January 2017. 
201 This implies that there are no limitations specific to this sector under the relevant mode except the conditions set 






The above implies that South Africa is currently allowing full service trade liberalisation202 
to its foreign services suppliers in all scheduled service sectors wishing to establish a commercial 
presence in SA by obtaining ownership of agricultural land.  
 
Based on these findings, and provided the Bill leads to a complete ban of FOAL, it would 
seem that the implementation of the Bill could be found to be in violation of SA’s specific 
commitments under the GATS Schedule. This is because the Bill would directly restrict all 
foreign services suppliers to which South Africa specifically committed openness to trade - from 
establishing a commercial presence here if they have not already done so, and should their 
establishment have involved the acquisition of agricultural land.203   
 
In light of this, and in the remaining part of this section, the following questions will now 
be considered: 
 
1) Which specific GATS commitment/s of South Africa will be infringed by the 
promulgation of the Bill? 
2) Are there any general exemptions applicable in favour of South Africa despite such 
violations? 





202 US-Gambling case, para. 6.279. 
203 It seems that if the Bill does not have a retrospective effect, on its promulgation it may not hamper the 
commercial presence of those foreign service providers already in place. 
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2.2.4 Which Specific GATS Commitments May Be Infringed? 
As mentioned before, these commitments made in relation to foreign service suppliers by all 
WTO Members under the GATS are provided for in Articles XVI (re ‘Market Access’), XVII 
(re ‘National Treatment’) and XVIII (re ‘Additional Commitments’) of the GATS. The first 
two of these commitments will now be considered in turn to determine whether they will be 
infringed when the Bill is enacted. 
2.2.4.1 The Market Access Commitment  
In terms of Article XVI of the GATS, fellow WTO Members negotiate and promise each other 
not to have recourse to certain proscribed measures impeding access to their markets unless they 
have indicated they would do so under their schedules of concessions.204 This commitment is 
also only applicable if a Member undertook a market-access commitment in relation to the 
supply of a service, and to not impose any new measures that would restrict entry into the 
market.205  
 
The Market Access Commitment under Article XVI:2, will be violated  by South Africa 
should the country impose any of the following restrictions (the ‘restrictions’), without them 
being contained in the GATS Schedule: 
a) the number of service providers; 
b) the total value of service transactions or assets; 
c) the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output; 
d) the total number of natural persons that may be employed; 
e) the forms of specific types of legal entity or joint venture; or 
f) foreign capital participation. 
 
It seems apparent why the above restrictions are prohibited. Each of them have the 
potential to restrict the freedom and capacity of foreign services suppliers to obtain access to the 
market of a host state and expand such access to their fullest potential. They also limit a 
                                                                




country’s competitive advantage. It therefore makes logical sense that for a WTO Member to be 
allowed these actions, the actions have to be officially added to its GATS schedule of specific 
commitments in terms of Article XVI:2. 
 
In the context of the RLHB, the legal question would therefore be in which way its 
promulgation restricts market access to foreign services suppliers of other WTO Members. It is 
the author’s view that the introduction of the Bill may be seen as falling afoul of points XVI:2(e) 
and (f) above for the following reasons: 
 
i.In respect of measures that restrict or require specific types or forms of legal entity or joint 
venture:  
a. The restriction of commercial presence relating to the exclusion of representative offices has 
been said to be an example of such measures.206  
b. Furthermore, the requirement that a joint venture be formed between foreign and local 
service providers in order to obtain access to a services market is only possible if the option 
was included in the schedule of commitments207 as well. This seems to entail in light of the 
RLHB, that it should not have the effect that foreign services providers are required to enter 
the market in a certain way unless the GATS Schedule provides for such an option.208  
c. By restricting the commercial presence of foreign property owning legal entities and thereby 
requiring that service suppliers owning agricultural land in South Africa forthwith be South 
African – the RLHB could fall into the ambit of limitation (e). 
 
ii.In respect of measures limiting the participation of foreign capital: 
a. It has been said that this limitation (f) relates to the imposition of: (i) ‘maximum percentage 
limits’ of participating foreign capital, (ii) the ‘maximum’ amount to be invested, or (iii) 
foreign equity ownership of more than 50% in a domestic juristic person.209  
                                                                
206 Petros C Mavroides & Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – Documents, Cases & 
Analysis, 2nd Ed (2013) Pages 784 – 785. 
207 XVI:2(e), GATS. 
208 Panagiotis Delimatsis and Martin Molinuevo, ‘Article XVI Market Access’, available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Panos_Delimatsis/publication/228157512_Article_XVI_GATS_Market_Acces
s/links/0deec5215c9cfa241f000000/Article-XVI-GATS-Market-Access.pdf, Page 15, accessed on 28 January 2017. 
209 Ibid note 208, Page 16. 
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b.  This means that measures which restrict the value of foreign investment in South Africa are 
restricted considering that the purchasing and developing of owned land necessarily 
involves greater foreign capital investment than leasing land. Should the Bill accordingly, 
restrict foreign ownership of South African owned juristic persons owning immovable 
property, because such restriction is not included in the GATS Schedule, Article XVI:2 
would be violated. 
 
2.2.4.2  The National Treatment Commitment 
The last, but certainly not the least important Specific Commitment to be discussed in the context 
of the RLHB, which South Africa has undertaken under the GATS, is the National Treatment 
Commitment. This commitment is provided for as follows in Article XVII:1: 
 
‘In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out 
therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in 
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that 
it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.’ [Emphasis added.] 
 
According to the WTO website,210 this commitment can be interpreted as: WTO Members 
not being allowed to operate ‘discriminatory measures’ benefitting domestic services or service 
suppliers, and which modify competition conditions in favour of a member’s own service 
industry above those of other WTO Members.  
 
Dissimilar to the Market Access commitment under the GATS, the National Treatment 
commitment does not seem to include a numerus clausus of limitations. The Panel in the EC 
Bananas III case found that the national treatment commitment constitutes a specific 
commitment because it binds a WTO Member ‘only in sectors or sub-sectors which that Member 
has inscribed in its schedule and to the extent specified therein.’211 The Panel furthermore found 
that by indicating ‘none’ in the national treatment column of a schedule of commitments, a WTO 
                                                                
210 WTO website, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm, accessed on 21 January 
2017.  
211 Panel Decision in EC-Bananas III case, Para7.305. 
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Member undertook ‘a full commitment on national treatment’212  in a relevant sector in relation 
to a relevant mode of supply.  
 
To determine whether a measure is in line with a country’s specific national treatment 
commitments, the Panel in this case213 further provided for the test to establish inconsistency of a 
particular measure implemented by a WTO Member with article XVII of the GATS. 214 The test 
entails the demonstration of three elements namely that:215 (i) a Member undertook a ‘specific 
commitment in a relevant sector and mode of supply’; (ii) the adopting or applying of a measure 
‘affecting the supply of services’ in the relevant sector or mode of supply;216 and (iii) this 
measure leads to one Member treating the service providers of ‘any other Member’ less 
favourably than its ‘own like service suppliers.’217 According to writers like Matsushita et al, the 
three elements that comprise this test must exist cumulatively.218 In the context of the RLHB, a 
claimant taking issue with the Bill will therefore have to argue along the lines of this test under 
the following four headings: 
 
i. South Africa undertook specific commitments to the applicable service sector and to a 
mode of supply:  
a. This has been said to be a factual enquiry.219 The claimant must show that South Africa’s 
GATS Schedule contains horizontal and sector specific National Treatment commitments 
in respect of the particular service sector complained of.  
b. As stated before, South Africa’s Schedule currently contains most service sectors with the 
exception of few. A potential claimant will therefore have to show that South Africa bound 
a particular service subsector as regards a service supplied through the commercial 
presence mode of supply without conditions.220  
                                                                
212 Panel Decision in EC-Bananas III case, Para7.306. 
213 Panel Decision in EC-Bananas III case, Para7.314. 
214 Matsushita et al, Page 662. 
215 Panel Decision in EC-Bananas III case, Para4.632. 
216 Ibid n215, Para4.633. 
217 Ibid n215. 
218 Matsushita et al, Page 662. 




c. The GATS Schedule currently shows full commitment in all service sectors and modes of 
supply in relation to foreign ownership of land because the Schedule contains no such land 
ownership restrictions.  
 
ii. South Africa adopted a measure which affects the supply of services in the claimant’s 
sector and mode of supply: 
a.  It has been found that the ‘supply of services’ via a commercial presence in terms of 
Article XXVIII:(b) comprises ‘the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of 
a service.’221 Therefore, a claimant will have to prove that the service in question, which is 
delivered on agricultural land, is affected by the promulgation of the RLHB. 
b.  For example, a service provider in a particular service sector (for example, in the hotel 
industry) – will therefore, have to prove that the prohibition prevents it from having a 
commercial presence in South Africa (for example, by owning hotels or holiday resorts on 
owned agricultural land).222  
 
iii. The relevant measure is applied to foreign like services or services suppliers: 
a. The claimant will, in the context of the Bill, have to show that by implementing the Bill, 
the ‘like’ foreign services suppliers in, for example, the foreign hospitality industry will be 
affected by the ownership prohibition, while the domestic hospitality industry will not be 
affected.  
b.  The Panel in the EC Bananas III case found, inter alia, that as long as the domestic and 
foreign entity provide the same service, they can be considered like service suppliers.223  
 
iv. The measure treats foreign services or service suppliers less favourably than their 
domestic counterparts: 
a.  A claimant will have to show that the Bill favours the relevant South African services 
sectors involving agricultural land, for example, the South African hospitality industry 
over the foreign hospitality industry.  
                                                                
221 Panel report of EC-Bananas case, Para. 7.316. 
222 See the discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure’ under section 2.2. 
223 Panel report of EC-Bananas case, Para. 7.322. 
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b.  The RLHB places a ban on FOAL, while at the same time not prohibiting but restricting 
domestic ownership to 12000 hectares.  It would therefore seem quite obvious that 
domestic service providers, for example, hotels or resorts in the tourism industry, will be 
treated more favourably by the promulgation of the Bill.  
c.   Some advantages of owning, as opposed to leasing land are that, as the most 
comprehensive right (within the confines of the law),224ownership secures the right to: 
derive income and financial stability from the land,225 consume, dispose of and mortgage 
it.226 Furthermore, studies have shown that FDI in ‘arable’ land in developing countries 
have increased over the years due to FDI in the agricultural sector being ‘closely linked’ to 
FDI in arable land.227 Investing in such land is seen to ‘secure and control’ access what is 
produced there. While leasing land may be the easiest way to gain a commercial presence, 
the main disadvantage is that leasing rights are dependent on the rights of the owner which 
may be taken away, for example, by sequestration.  
It is the author’s view that by introducing the Bill, the country may be in violation of its 
GATS National Treatment Commitments as it has not made provision for any exemptions under 
Article XIV of GATS and it has indicated no limitations on the importation of, for example, 
tourism, construction or other services in the GATS Schedule relating to ownership of 
agricultural land.  
 
The rest of this Chapter will now be dedicated to investigating some of the options South 
Africa have in light of the potential GATS violations and specifically, what South Africa will 
have to do in order to bring the RLHB in line with its GATS specific commitments. Firstly, I will 
deal with possible justification grounds which South Africa may raise in the event of another 
WTO Member complaining about the Bill. Secondly, I will discuss the option to modify or 
withdraw some of the country’s relevant commitments under Article XXI of the GATS. This, it 
                                                                
224 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert, Silberberg & Schoeman, The Law of Property, 5th Ed, 2006, P91. 
225 Available at, http://www.businesspartners.co.za/media-room/posts/business-partners-continue-to-see-value-in-sa-
commercial-property-1091/ 
226 Badenhorst et al, op cit n224, P92-93. 
227 GTZ, ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Land in Developing Countries’, (2009) available at: 
https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/Fachexpertise/giz2010-en-foreign-direct-investment-dc.pdf, P6, 
accessed 12 March 2017.  
49 
 
seems, is what South Africa has been prompted to do relatively often recently, albeit for various 
other new legislation.228  
 
2.3  GATS General Exceptions 
A discussion of the violations of South Africa’s General Obligations and Specific Commitments 
is incomplete without considering Article XIV of the GATS providing for general exceptions. 
Hereby violations of the obligations and commitments under the GATS may be condoned in 
exceptional circumstances. This GATS Article is vital for South Africa as it demonstrates why 
the Government should seriously consider the possible modification of its GATS Commitments 
in relation to the RLHB.  
In the event of a fellow WTO Member officially complaining of the implementation of the 
RLHB due to any of the possible violations discussed in the previous section, South Africa will 
have to legally justify such implementation. This will likely involve high standards of review of 
the country’s public policies underlying the prohibition of FOAL, as will be demonstrated in this 
section. 
The most relevant general public interest exceptions are as follows: 
‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:   
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) … 
                                                                
228 JB Cronje, ‘Will South Africa Modify its GATS Commitments?’ (2015), available at: 
http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7183-will-south-africa-modify-its-gats-commitments.html: & WTO E-
Learning 12, ‘Introduction to Trade in Services in the WTO’, available at: 
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_385/Module_1568/ModuleDocuments/GATS-L1-R1-E.pdf, Page 23 & 
Gerhard Erasmus, ‘The Regulation of Private Security Firms in South Africa: What are the Governance Signals?’ 
(2014) available at: http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5715-the-regulation-of-private-security-firms-in-south-
africa-what-are-the-governance-signals.html; Scot Sinclair, ‘The GATS and South  Africa’s National Health Act a 
Cautionary Tale’ available at 
(http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/sites/municipalservicesproject.org/files/publications/OccasiolPaper11_Sin
clair_The_GATs_and_South_Africa%27s_National_Health_Act_A_Cautionary_Tale_May2006.pdf (2006), 
Municipal Services Project, Occasional Papers Series 11, accessed 16 January 2017. 
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(c) …
Footnote 5: The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.…’ [Emphasis added] 
According to Cottier et al, Article XIV and its counterpart in the GATT, namely Article 
XX, upon which Article XIV is modelled, are the ‘cornerstones’ of international trade. 229 
According to them, the Articles support the ‘legitimate  non-economic policy objectives’ of WTO 
Members while simultaneously, seeking to prevent the misuse of the GATS general exceptions 
‘to pursue rent-seeking, protectionist policies, undermining existing obligations and 
commitments.’230 
To determine if South Africa will be allowed any justification under Article XIV(a) this 
established two-tier test, as developed in cases like the US-Gambling case231and the China – 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products case,232 should be followed.233 This entails proving that the 
implementation of the RLHB as a GATS measure, is both:    
(i) Preliminarily justified under the public order exception as provided for in Article
XIV(a) and - is necessary to protect the interests (namely: land reform) intended to
be protected thereby (‘question 1’); and
(ii) In line with the principles laid down in the chapeau, namely it is not arbitrary,
discriminatory or trade restrictive (‘question 2’).
For question 1: 
To simplify one’s understanding of the two-tier test, one could use the AB’s application of 
Article XIV in relation to the shifting of the burden of proof between a complaining and 
229 T. Cottier, Delimatsis P & Diebold, N., 'Article XIV, General Exceptions,' Max Planck  Commentaries On World 
Trade Law, Wto - Trade In Services, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Clemens Feinäugle 6 (2008), P2. 
230 Ibid n229, P2. 
231 Panel Report in US – Gambling case, Para 6.449. 
232 AB Report in China - Audiovisual Entertainment Products case, Para5.14. 
233 Ibid n229, P5 & n178, P804. 
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responding party during the investigation of a complaint.234 In the event of a GATS obligation 
being found prima facie infringed,235 a responding WTO Member will naturally raise the 
justification grounds first.  
According to Cottier et al, the first question would then be answered by determining 
initially the content of the policy objective sought by the implementation of the measure.236 
Applied to the RLHB, South Africa would accordingly have to show that the land reform 
objective of the Bill falls under at least one of the public interest considerations as listed in 
Article XIV. It is the author’s view that the possible justification ground in terms of Article XIV 
which South Africa could possibly argue in its favour is Article XIV(a) as it relates to the ground 
of public order. If it can be proven that the RLHB’s objective falls under Article XIV(a), it 
would imply that it is provisionally justified.237 
According to Cottier et al, as part of this first step South Africa will have to show that the 
trade of the services in question (i.e. the trade in foreign services involving FOAL in South 
Africa), harms or endangers the aims of the domestic policy in question (namely, prohibiting 
FOAL for land reform purposes).238 This step can also involve the consideration if the measure 
(the RLHB) is designed to mainly protect the public order.239  
The Panel in the US-Gambling case defined public order as follows: ‘the preservation of 
the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law. These fundamental 
interests can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and morality.’240 Furthermore, the 
                                                                
234 US – Gambling case, Para 309-311. 





2087010&EXT=pdf, Page 5, accessed on 18 January 2017. 
235 US-Gambling case, para 6.467. 
236 Cottier et al, Page 6. 
237 Cottier et al, Page 5. 
238 Cottier et al, Page 6. 
239 Ibid note 235, Page 7. 
240 Panel Report, US-Gambling case, para 6.467. 
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application of the public order exception is restricted241 to only those instances where genuine 
and sufficiently serious threats are posed to a ‘fundamental interest of society’.242 
In respect of the second part of question 1 above: the next question is whether the 
RLHB’s promulgation is ‘necessary’243 to prevent genuine and sufficiently serious threats to a 
fundamental interest of society, which may include: access to land for all South Africans, the 
prevention of food shortage and achieving equality amongst South Africans.244 For this a 
‘necessity test’ under Article XIV(a) is to ensure that a distinction is drawn between measures 
fulfilling important policy and those measures that involve protectionism.245 This test, according 
to the Panel in the US-Gambling case, is an objective one246 and consists of the weighing and 
balancing of various factors.247 It basically entails the enquiry of whether the Bill is vital to 
achieve the relevant public policy, namely land reform. 
It has been said, that the outcome of a judicial investigation will depend on the significance 
of the interest to be protected and that proving necessity is a cumbersome task.248 This is because 
it consists of various steps which have been developed over years of mainly GATT 
jurisprudence. The test first entails a balancing of the importance of the objective (as per Article 
XIV) which the measure is designed to achieve - against whether the measure will actually 
contribute to such objective and whether and to what extent it will limit international trade.249 In 
other words, once it has been determined that the Bill will materially contribute250 to the public 
policy goal of land reform and ultimately, equality amongst South Africans, this needs to 
outweigh the RLHB’s trade restrictive effect.251 Once this is established, the Bill will be prima 
facie justified.252  
                                                                
241 Cottier et al, P8. 
242 Article XIV(a) must be read together with footnote 5 of Article XIV which qualifies the application of the public 
order exception. 
243 This requirement is contained under Article XIV in relation to the importance of the measure implemented. 
244 See the policy discussion under section 1.2. 
245 Cottier et al, P19. 
246 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling case, Para304. 
247 Appellate Body Report, US -  Gambling case, Para305. 
248 Cottier et al, P3. 
249 Ibid n235, P17. 
250 AB Report, Brazil- Retreaded Tyres, Para150. 
251 AB Report, China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, Para310. 
252 Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting the WTO Rulings on US-Gambling 
and China – Publications and Audiovisual Products’, (2011) Journal of International Economic Law, 14(2) P264. 
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Once South Africa as respondent has established the existence of a prima facie justification 
of the Bill, the onus of proof will shift to the complainant Member who has to prove that the 
respondent had alternative options that do not restrict the international commerce and that 
therefore, the Bill’s implementation cannot be justified.253 Here the complainant Member will 
have to prove, for example, that the Bill need not be implemented to achieve South Africa’s land 
reform goals as there are other less trade restrictive alternatives reasonably available. Moreover, 
an alternative measure is one that is not only reasonably available, but also capable of achieving 
the respondent’s desired level of protection as sought under Article XIV.254  
The onus will then shift back to South Africa who will have to prove that the challenged 
measure is still necessary, or that the proposed alternative measure is not reasonably available, or 
that it cannot achieve the same level of protection or attain the objective pursued.255 In the 
context of the Bill, the enquiry the country therefore has to make is whether there exists any 
alternatives to the outright prohibition of FOAL that can achieve the same public policy that is 
less trade restrictive. 
For question 2: 
In terms of the chapeau of Article XIV, the exceptions provided for will only be applicable if the 
manner in which the measure is applied does not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or … a disguised restriction on trade in services’. According to the AB in the US 
- Gambling case, this chapeau fulfils the function of ensuring that the measure is in good faith.256 
It also ensures that the relevant WTO Member instituting the measure, acts reasonably toward 
other WTO Members in the way that the measure is implemented by not frustrating their 
substantive GATS rights.257   
To determine whether the application of the RLHB’s promulgation is consistent with the 
chapeau, South Africa will have to prove that cumulatively it will not entail:258 (i) arbitrary 
                                                                
253 Ibid n235, P20. 
254 AB Report, US Gambling case, Para.308. 
255 Ibid note 235, P21. 
256 AB Report, US-Gambling case, para339. 
257 AB Report, US-Shrimp case, paras156 – 158.  
258 Appellate Report, US – Shrimp case, Para150 and applied in Panel Report, US-Gambling case, Para6.581. 
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discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail (ii) unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; or (iii) amounts to a 
disguised international trade restriction. 
Firstly, for the RLHB to amount to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ discrimination, it must 
involve: (a) discrimination (b) which has an arbitrary or unjustifiable character; and (c) the 
discrimination occurs between countries where the same conditions prevail.259 In the US-
Gambling case, the Panel relied on the US-Shrimp case to find that the nature and quality of the 
discrimination under the chapeau is different than under the substantive GATS obligations 
because this discrimination relates to the manner in which the measure is applied.260 
Discrimination, was found to exist when a measure prohibiting the remote supply of gambling 
services was applied in an inconsistent manner - as between domestic and foreign services or 
service suppliers.261  
Secondly, WTO adjudicating bodies have wide discretions to determine, based on 
sufficient evidence, what constitutes ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination – which must 
exist before a measure will be found inconsistent with the chapeau of GATS.262 To illustrate this, 
Cottier et al suggested an approach similar to the one taken by the Panel in the US-Shrimp case. 
In this case, the Panel considered various factors leading to the conclusion that the United States 
unjustifiably discriminated on the basis of imposing an import ban on shrimp from some but not 
on other countries.263 These factors included that: (i) the import ban was applied unilaterally and 
only some but not all Members were negotiated with before its implementation;264 and (ii) the 
ban lacked flexibility because it did not take account of the circumstances of all countries 
involved.265 Regarding arbitrariness, the AB found that the import ban was not applied fairly, 
                                                                
259 Appellate Report, US – Shrimp case, Para150. Note: the Panel in the US-Gambling case incorporated the 
Panel’s interpretation of the chapeau in the US-Shrimp case into GATS practice as well. See Para6.571. 
260 Panel Report, US-Gambling case, Para6.578. 
261 Panel Report, US-Gambling case, Para351. 
262 Ibid n229, P26. 
263 AB Report, US-Shrimp case, Paras166-177. 
264 AB Report, US-Shrimp case, Para172. 
265 AB Report, US-Shrimp case, Para177. 
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transparently, predictably, with due process allowing for applicants to be heard or for a review 
process.266 
Thirdly, what it meant by ‘between countries where like conditions prevail’ in the 
chapeau, has been interpreted by the AB267 to imply that the discrimination can occur, not only 
between different exporting Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing 
Member concerned.268 
The promulgation of the RLHB will probably not discriminate between international 
service suppliers in South Africa because all who require ownership of agricultural land will be 
prohibited from owning it. However, the discussion of the chapeau above shows, that the manner 
in which the RLHB is applied may also not discriminate between South African and other WTO 
Members. South Africa will therefore, have to prove that the prohibition of only FOAL and not 
of national ownership of like agricultural land as well, does not amount to arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination against other WTO Members. For example, the prohibition will not 
apply to large South African-owned wine and other farmers, who most probably own a larger 
portion of the country’s agricultural land required for land reform.   
Finally, in order to be consistent with the chapeau of Article XIV GATS, the RLHB must 
not constitute ‘disguised restriction on trade in services’. Cottier et al, are of the view that WTO 
jurisprudence on this matter is limited but noted that the Appellant Body confirmed that it 
encompasses at least ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination.269 
From the above it follows, that in order for the possible violations of South Africa’s 
National Treatment and Market Access Commitments to be justified, South Africa will have to 
prove that the promulgation of the RLHB is not only necessary for land reform, but the manner 
in which it is implemented does not amount to arbitrary, unjustifiable or disguised trade. If South 
Africa can provide sufficient evidence justifying the promulgation of the RLHB, it may be 
                                                                
266 AB Report, US-Shrimp case, Para180-183. 
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allowed to do so – however, it remains to be seen if the prohibition of FOAL, the extent of which 
is unknown, will materially support South Africa’s land reform goals.  
We turn now to the discussion of how South Africa could modify or withdraw its GATS 
Commitments in order to avoid having to justify the promulgation of the RLHB. 
 
2.4 Modification of SA’s Specific GATS Commitments  
When a WTO Member institutes measures such as the RLHB that have the effect of violating 
any of the Member’s specific commitments, the general rule is that the specific commitments 
could be amended. It has been said, however, that the experiences of the United States and the 
European Union have shown, that this is not an easy task and may involve long periods of 
negotiation on suitable compensation.270 
The option of modification or withdrawal is provided for in Article XXI(1)(a) of the GATS 
as follows: 
‘1. (a) A Member (referred to in this Article as the "modifying Member") may modify or 
withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at any time after three years have elapsed from the 
date on which that commitment entered into force, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article.’ [Emphasis added] 
 Should South Africa accordingly wish to modify or withdraw any of its Specific 
Commitments in relation to the implementation of the RLHB, it is clear from the wording of 
Article XXI(1)(a) that such amendment will be possible as more than three years have lapsed 
since South Africa’s GATS Schedule came into force. The amendment will have to be effected 
in terms of Article XXI(1)(b) with notification of the intent to do so to the Council for Trade in 
Services by no later than three months before the intended date of implementation of the 





Furthermore, Article XXI(2)(a) provides that the amendment process must involve the 
negotiation of the modified commitments with all WTO Members that constitute ‘affected 
Members’ upon the request of such affected Members. Article XXI(2)(a) also obliges the 
‘modifying Member’ to negotiate with the affected Members to reach consensus on any 
necessary compensatory adjustment in exchange for the modification. An important implication 
of this negotiation is provided for by the remainder of Article XXI(2)(a) though, which provides 
that during the negotiations the Members must: ‘endeavour to maintain a general level of 
mutually advantageous commitments not less favourable to trade than that provided for in 
Schedules of specific commitments prior to such negotiations.’ This means that compensation 
will entail the negotiation of a ‘more ambitious binding elsewhere’ which is not less favourable 
than what existed before.271 Article XXI(2)(b) finally provides that compensation adjustments 
must be made on a most-favoured-nation (‘mfn’) basis.  
According to Article XXI(3)(a), however, which deals with the situation when WTO 
Members do not agree on the compensatory adjustment during the negotiations, the affected 
Member may refer the matter to arbitration for resolution. Should the arbitration conclude that 
compensation applies, the relevant commitments may not be modified until the compensatory 
adjustment was actually made. 272  If the modifying Member does not adhere to the decision of 
the arbitrator, affected Members may retaliate by modifying or withdrawing equivalent 
commitments.273 The modification or withdrawal by the affected Member will then apply only to 
the modifying Member and regardless of Article II of the GATS relating to MFN Treatment.274  
Should South Africa be requested by an Affected Member, or elect to modify its GATS 
Schedule to make provision for the prohibition on ownership of agricultural land, the 
modification may be implemented in either horizontal or in a specific service sectors (for 
example, for the tourism specifically) to which the prohibition is most relevant.  
 The next Chapter will now look at why the RLHB’s promulgation may violate South 
Africa’s BITs.  
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Would the prohibition of FOAL violate any BIT obligations? 
 
Apart from being a party to the GATS as a multilateral agreement, South Africa also concluded 
various Bilateral Investment Treaties with other countries worldwide, of which approximately 15 
are currently still in force.275 
 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry (the ‘DTI’), the reason why South 
Africa initially concluded many BITs was to ‘signal’ the country’s return to the international 
community after Apartheid.276 Furthermore, the aim was to give the assurance to foreign 
investors that their investments in South Africa would be secure in an attempt to encourage the 
inflow of FDI.277  
 
Despite this apparent initial popularity, the Government has in recent years communicated 
openly about its changed policy framework on foreign investments mostly related to BITs for 
various reasons. These reasons mainly relate to the country’s priority of reforming its laws in 
achieving equality for its citizens. It has even been said, that the BITs concluded were 
inconsistent with the Constitution278 and that the threat of possible arbitration following a recent 
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investment-state arbitration claim against South Africa, to be discussed below, prompted the 
move away from BITs.279  
 
The latest investment policy framework adopted by the Government in 2010 aiming to 
‘strengthen’ the country’s investment regime, confirmed the country’s aim to remain open to 
foreign investment and securing investments, while at the same time retaining sovereignty to 
regulate in the public interest.280  In this regard, the measures which the Government intended to 
put in place,281 of which some have already been adopted include the: (i) promulgation of the 
Protection of Investments Act (‘PIA’)282 which is to replace BITs in future;283 (ii) restricting the 
conclusion of BITs to only when there are ‘compelling economic or political reasons’; (iii) 
development of a BIT template with standard provisions to improve their interpretations; 284 and 
(iv) review or termination of most BITs up for review. 
 
The weaknesses identified by the DTI285 in respect of BITs mainly involve the nature of 
investor-state arbitration. These ‘weaknesses’ include the absence of a predictable precedent 
system; the confidentiality thereof; the wide interpretations of BIT protections and the possible 
imbalance between investors’ rights and state’s sovereign law-making powers. 
 
By implementing the measures as set out above, like the PIA and trying to restrict the use 
of BITs, it seems that the Government is deeply aware of the potential liabilities it faces in the 
wake of implementing domestic laws affecting foreign investors. Nevertheless, whilst there are 
unquestionably essential grounds for why South Africa should be allowed to implement 
legislation like the RLHB, the rights of those who have invested in the country in good faith in 
the past will most probably not be ignored by arbitration tribunals at present or in future. While 
                                                                
279 Amy Farish, ‘Protection of Investments Act – A balancing Act between policies and investments’ , (2016), De 
Rebus, available at: http://www.derebus.org.za/protection-investments-act-balancing-act-policies-investments/, 
accessed on 19 January 2017. 
280 Ibid n306, P29. 
281 Ibid n306, P30. 
282 22 of 2015. 
283 Azwimpheleli Langalanga, ‘Regulations for Foreign Investor Act Weighted Towards Dispute Settlement’, South 
African Institute of International Affairs (2017) Available at: http://www.polity.org.za/article/regulations-for-
foreign-investor-act-weighted-towards-dispute-settlement-2017-01-13, accessed on 19 January 2017. 
284 By preventing inconsistent, unpredictable and arbitrary interpretations. 
285 Ibid n306, P26. 
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the author naturally fully appreciates the Government’s policy goals potentially enshrined in the 
Bill, the Government should not lose sight of the ongoing non-appealable threat of international 
investor-state arbitration in the short to medium run before taking legislative steps such as the 
Bill.  
This is because existing sunset clauses in BITs increase the life-span of most BITs, and 
because the PIA along with its draft Mediation Regulations286 do not apply to investments 
protected by existing BITs. 287 The PIA, while aiming to, inter alia: protect investments subject 
to the Constitution; balance public interest against investor rights and obligations; and protect 
host state sovereignty - has been said to not providing sufficient comfort.288 This is because it 
does not: (i) provide for the typical BIT FET protections; (ii) deal with the scope of indirect 
expropriation; (iii) provide for investor-state arbitration as an option, but restricts arbitration to 
‘state-state’ arbitration with Government’s prior consent.  
As a potential law which will be affecting the current and future rights and interests of 
foreign investors in agricultural land in South Africa, the RLHB must be considered in light of 
South Africa’s existing BIT obligations and commitments. Ultimately, my aim is to determine 
whether or not by implementing the Bill, South Africa may possibly be found guilty of 
contravening the BIT protections it contractually agreed to provide under existing BITs. In doing 
this, the Chapter will deal with (i) how South Africa’s BITs are protecting its foreign investors’ 
rights to property; and (ii) what the possible impacts of the Bill will be on South Africa’s BIT 





286 Published on 30 December 2016 for comments by 28 January 2017, in the Government Gazette No. 40526, 
Notice No. 958/2016, available at: http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/40526_gen958.pdf Page 53, accessed 
on 19 January 2017. 




3.1 South African BITS Include Typical Commitments and 
Protections 
 
This section will show that by restricting existing and future FOAL in South Africa by way of 
the RLHB, the Government is likely to breach some of its commitments in terms of its operative 
BITs. What these commitments are and how they are likely to be affected in a BIT-relevant way 
depend on the existing rights of foreign owners in terms of these treaties. It will become apparent 
on a closer look at South Africa’s BITs, that the BITs contain the usual host country 
commitments and investor protections with nuanced differences found in model BITs around the 
world.289 An analysis of these protections will reveal that they are familiar compared to those 
discussed under the GATS. 
 
When considering the protections provided for by BITs in relation to the ownership of 
immovable property – one should note that there are two major rights which BITs do not protect, 
namely: 
(a) The right to own immovable property in a host state:  This is because it seems that most of 
the South African BITs contain the provision to the effect that‘[e]ach contracting party…shall 
admit such investments in accordance with its laws.’290 It has been said, that this can be 
interpreted to imply that host countries only need to allow foreign investments in land, for 
example, to the extent that its domestic law allows it.291 In relation to promulgation of the Bill 
this implies that upon it becoming law, no foreign investor can in future rely on BIT 




289 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties. Implications for Development and Human 
Rights’ Dialogue on Globalisation, (November 2006), p. 9 -10, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2016. 
290 Article 2(1) of the Germany-South Africa BIT. 
291 Ibid n10, at P3. 
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(b) The right that immovable property will not be expropriated: This is because the provisions of 
most South African BITs do not protect any foreign investor against expropriation per se. 
Investors in the host state and in the investor’s country are only protected against expropriation if 
the conditions contained in most BITs were not complied with. These include for instance: public 
interest, due process, non-discrimination considerations as well as payment of ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.’292  
 The next section will commence with a discussion of the preliminary investigation into 
whether an investment falls within the ambit of a BIT for dispute resolution purposes. That will 
be followed by an analysis of some of the commitments and protections typically found in BITs, 
which could potentially be violated by South Africa when promulgating the RLHB.  
 
3.1.1 Preliminary Investigations 
The investigation of whether the prohibition of ownership of foreign agricultural land in South 
Africa, infringes any BIT protections will commence with the preliminary question of whether a 
particular investor and investment are covered by the provisions of a BIT.293  This is because 
BITs only protect those investors and investments as defined therein.294 How this is to be 
determined is by following the wording of most of South Africa’s BITs.295 Before a foreign 
investor may rely on the protections covered by a BIT when complaining about a measure 
implemented by a host state – it has to determine the following: 
(i) Whether an investment and the complaining investor fall under the defined investments 
and investors in a particular BIT; and 
(ii) Whether the investment was in place during the relevant operational timeframe of the BIT. 
                                                                
292 Article 4(1) Germany-South Africa BIT. 
293 Campbell Mc Lachlan QC, Laurence Shore, Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration Substantive 
Principles, (2008), 1st Ed, P163. 
294 Barton Legum, ‘Defining Investment and Investor:  Who Is Entitled to Claim?’ (2005)  Symposium Co-
Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD - Making The Most of International Investment Agreements: A 
Common Agenda, available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36370461.pdf, 
Pages 1-6, accessed on 21 January 2017. 
295 Campbell et al, op cit n293, P174. 
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A brief review of all South Africa’s operative BITs shows that investment in immovable 
property is one of the defined means of investments to be protected in South African BITs. 
Foreign investments in South African immovable property, which include agricultural land, are 
therefore explicitly protected by this country’s BITs.  
 
Furthermore, and in relation to the second enquiry above, an investor will have to 
determine if at the time when an investment was made - a relevant BIT was in place in order to 
rely on it. It has been said that BITs usually do not require that an investment must have been 
made after a BIT came into force in order to be protected. This is because BITs generally 
provide that its scope extends to investments made before and after it came into force.296 
Nonetheless, claims in terms of BITs may usually only be brought as provided for in the BIT and 
only after the BIT entered into force.297 In the event of it being terminated, an investor must 
show that a grace period is provided for in the BIT within which South Africa may be held 
accountable despite such termination.298 These grace periods are also known as ‘sunset-clauses’ 
which mostly provide that the commitments and protections in BITs remain intact for periods of 
up to ten and twenty years after termination of a BIT.299 For example, the Germany-South Africa 
BIT which terminated on 22 October 2014 also provides for a typical sunset clause.300 Article 
13(3) of this BIT provides that its provisions will stay effective after termination thereof in 
respect of investments made prior to the termination, for a period of twenty years.  
 
3.1.2 The Protections Provided by South African BITS 
Once it is settled that the protections contained in a BIT are applicable to investors during a 




298 Agnieszka Zarowna, ‘Termination of BITs and Sunset Clauses – What Can Investors in Poland Expect?’(2017) 
available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/category/sunset-clauses/, accessed on 6 March 2017. 
299 Ibid n298. 
300 UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub website, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/195/treaty/1757. Accessed on 12 January 2017. 
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dispute resolution forums as provided for in South Africa’s BITs, for example: investor-state 
arbitration.301  
 
In order to do this, however, the applicable investors will have to show that any of the 
protections to which the South African Government committed vis a vis their investments in 
terms of a BIT, were infringed. These protections are what the rest of this section will deal with 
in order to demonstrate the kind of possible claims the Bill’s promulgation may potentially 
prompt.  
 
From a review of the preambles of all of South Africa’s BITs currently in force, the ground 
rules on which the BIT standards are based are the promotion of, for example: stable and 
predictable investment environments, legitimate expectations, transparency, consistency and 
non-arbitrary conduct. Furthermore, BITs in general and equally for the BITs in place between 
South Africa and other states, set out to protect the investments in South Africa by the relevant 
contracting states’ investors and vice versa.302 The typical protections which South Africa as a 
host state and the other contracting states have agreed to in favour of investors include the 
following two most relevant ones for purposes of for this thesis: 303 
(i) Expropriation of property will only be in the public interest, according to due process of 
law, and with compensation; and 
(ii) Investors requiring full physical and legal protection and security of their investments.  
To determine accordingly whether the investors of South Africa’s BIT partners will 
potentially have any rights of recourse in terms of a breach or violation of any of the BITs, one 
has to determine from the investor’s point of view, the rights which may be infringed in terms of 
the protections as provided for by these treaties.  
 
                                                                
301 R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford and W. Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes, Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, (2005), 1st Ed, Kluwer Law International, Page 10; Ibid n294, P5-6. 
302 Ibid n305, P103. 
303 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties. Implications for Development and Human 
Rights’ Dialogue on Globalisation, (November 2006), p. 9, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf, accessed on 21 November 2016. 
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3.1.2.1 Expropriation in Public Interest, with Due Process and 
Compensation 
Writers like Dolzer and Schreuer are of the view that the international law rules on expropriation 
of foreign property have been the ‘central concern’ predominantly for foreign investors for many 
years304 and another said expropriation is almost always complained of in investor-state 
arbitration.305 This brings us to the RLHB whereby our Government on the one hand aims to 
prohibit FOAL, and on the other, recognises the critical impacts of foreign direct investment on 
economic development and growth.306 With this in mind, the Bill will now be considered in the 
realm of expropriation to determine whether, directly or indirectly, it may lead to expropriation 
and essentially: if it will be in line with the conditions for expropriation as provided for in the 
BITs. 
As seen above, the RLHB will not have a retrospective effect,307 which implies that there 
will be no direct expropriation of foreign-owned immovable property in South Africa when the 
Bill becomes law.308 Indeed, direct expropriation would probably lead to various compensation 
claims in the investor-state arbitration forum against the South African Government, but this 
seems not to be on the agenda in terms of the RLHB for now.309 Nevertheless, as seen above, it is 
also anticipated that the promulgation of the RLHB will entail the implementation land ceilings 
of up to 12 000 hectares and that land in excess hereof will be purchased by Government who 
indicated that this will involve compensation on a fair and equitable basis.310  
                                                                
304 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 89. 
305 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law Reconciling Policy and Principle, (2008) 1st Ed, P120. 
306 Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, ‘South Africa’s Trade and Investment Policy, a Presentation to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee’, (2015) available at:  
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/SA_Trade_Investment_Policy.pdf, at P21, accessed on 12 January 2017. 
307 See section 1.1 above. 
308 Ibid n24. 
309 South African Government News Agency, ‘New Legislation to come before Parliament’, (2016), available at: 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/new-legislations-come-parliament, accessed on 13 January 2017. 
310 See section 1.1 above. 
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Moreover, it has been said that direct expropriation has become ‘rare’ in international 
investments because the authorised taking of foreign property title may lead to the damage of a 
country’s reputation311 if the expropriation was arbitrary and without proper compensation.  
As seen above,312 of the main uncertainties concerning the promulgation of the RLHB in 
light of existing foreign owned agricultural land, is the for example, the possibility of existing 
foreign owners being restricted to disposing of their agricultural land to South Africans.  This 
section will accordingly focus on the probability of foreign investors from South Africa’s BIT 
partner countries claiming that the  RLHB leads to indirect expropriation of their existing 
property rights, which the author is of the view, may be the ancillary effect of the Bill. 
It is important to note for now though that all of South Africa’s BITs currently in force and 
those terminated but containing sunset clauses, contain expropriation clauses. Of these, some 
expressly make provision for both direct and indirect expropriation, while others may be 
interpreted as such.313 
To illustrate this, some examples of the types of expropriation clauses found in South 
Africa’s BITs are as follows: 
In the China-South Africa BIT: 
‘Article 4  
1. Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated, or subjected to measures having effects equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation") in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party except for public purposes, under domestic legal procedure, on a non-
discriminatory basis and against compensation. …  
 





311 Ibid n304, P92. 
312 See section 1.1 for the discussion on the practical implications of the RLHB on existing FOAL. 
313 Ibid n304, P93. 
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In the Sweden-South Africa BIT: 
‘Article 4 Expropriation and Compensation  
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, an 
investor of the other Contracting Party of an investment unless the following conditions are 
complied with:  
(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law;  
(b) the measures are distinct and not discriminatory; and  
(c) the measures are accompanied by provisions for the payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, which shall be transferable without delay in a freely convertible 
currency.  
(2) …….  
(3) ……’ [Emphasis added.] 
 
From these examples it is clear that expropriation in the context of South Africa’s BITs 
typically are not only restricted to direct expropriation, and regardless of how the protection is 
worded, they mainly contain protection against indirect expropriation. It also seems that either 
the BITs refer explicitly to indirect expropriation/deprivation,314 like in the case of the Sweden-
South Africa BIT, or it refers to ‘measures having effects equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation’ as seen in the China-South Africa BIT. There is also a general consensus that 
most BITs in existence contain similar wording.315  
Based on the wording of the example expropriation clauses contained in South African 
BITs as set out above, it can be argued that foreign BIT investors will have to claim that an 
investment has been indirectly expropriated and that therefore, all the conditions pertaining to 
expropriation should be complied with.316 In its defence South Africa will, as is the case most 
                                                                
314 It is the author’s view, that the use of ‘deprivation’ in this BIT should not be confused with the concept of 
deprivation in terms of Section 25(1) of the Constitution (which is not discussed). Deprivation in the Constitution is 
distinguished from expropriation because it is seen as a wider concept encompassing expropriation - as only some 
deprivations will constitute expropriation. [See Currie, I & De Waal, J, the Bill of Rights Handbook, (2013) 6th 
Edition, P541.] In the context of International Investment Law though, it has been said to be a synonym for 
expropriation. [See OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004/04, "Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” In International Investment Law, (2004) available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/WP-2004_4.pdf, P3, accessed on 2 March 2017.] 
315 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit, n311, P93. 
316 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Expropriation, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II, (2012), available at: http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf, 
P12–27, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
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probably for other host states subject to expropriation provisions under their BITs,317 then have 
to prove the fulfilment of the following conditions318 which were extracted from South African 
BITs: 
a. That the expropriation was for public purposes and with regard of due process; 
b. It was done under domestic legal procedure, on a non-discriminatory basis; and 
c. It was against compensation. 
In determining whether the introduction of the Bill comes down to indirect expropriation 
for which the above conditions must be met, the next section will deal with this concept, 
followed by the requirements or conditions. 
 
    a) Will the Bill Authorise Indirect Expropriation? 
It is notable that South Africa’s BITs do not clearly define what is meant by indirect 
expropriation or by measures having the effect equivalent to expropriation. My research also did 
not reveal an all-encompassing definition of what constitutes indirect expropriation, which 
appears to depend very much on the circumstances having the effect of possible indirect 
expropriation.   
One wide definition found, however, refers to those measures that ‘leave the investor’s title 
untouched’ but at the same time takes away the ability of the investor to use its investment in a 
meaningful way.319 An arbitral tribunal approached by an investor complaining of an indirect 
expropriation will therefore have to determine, based on the facts of the particular case,320 
whether the measure reduces or takes away any of the property rights of the investor.  
A closer look at the ways in which arbitral tribunals and courts internationally have 
interpreted the term indirect expropriation reveal a certain pattern although it seems to still be 
                                                                
317 Ibid n311, P91. 
318 Ibid n316, P27. 
319 Ibid n311. 
320 Ibid n311, P96. 
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debateable.321 In this regard, UNCTAD suggested that indirect expropriation may be 
characterised by the existence of: 322 (i) a governmental act; (ii) which interferes with property 
rights/interests; (iii) to the degree that the rights/interest lose ‘all or most of their value or the 
owner is deprived of control over the investment’; and (iv) the owners preserves title or 
possession thereof (the ‘UNCTAD test’).  
An aggrieved BIT foreign investor in South Africa will therefore have to prove that the Bill 
has the effect of depriving the investor of a substantial part of its property rights in owned 
agricultural land.323 The kind of measures constituting indirect expropriation encompass a wide 
range of government actions such as regulations and acts.324 From interpretations of model BITs, 
it has been said that mostly those government measures that interfere with a ‘tangible or 
intangible property right or property interest in an investment’ may be open to expropriation.325 
Property rights were defined by UNCTAD as those crucial rights ‘inherent in the property’ 
including the usage and disposal thereof.326 In this regard, others have also said that indirect 
expropriation includes: ‘prohibitions on sale…through measures…permanent of…duration’ and 
the ‘forced sale of property…at grossly substandard prices….’327 
As a result of the RLHB potentially restricting the use and disposal rights in foreign-owned 
agricultural land, it seems that its implementation may be challenged on the basis of it amounting 
to the indirect expropriation of such rights.  It is clear, however, that as per the UNCTAD test, 
the degree of interference (for example on the value of property) in such property rights will 
determine if it will amount to indirect expropriation.  
However, on the side of caution, it has been said that a clear distinction must be maintained 
between the (i) normal regulatory rights of governments which do not constitute indirect 
expropriation and (ii) indirect expropriation.328 The difference between these two concepts are 
vital as the Government should be allowed to make laws not constituting indirect expropriation 
                                                                
321 Ibid n311, P93. 
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for which they need not pay compensation.329  If it is determined that the measure is not a normal 
regulatory measure aimed at the welfare of the people but rather directed and irregular, it will be 
considered indirect expropriation.330  
In the case of Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and Others v The Republic of South Africa,331 
for example, which has been a landmark case for South Africa, 332 the arbitral tribunal in an 
ICSID investor-state arbitration hearing had to decide if South Africa was guilty of unlawfully 
expropriating Italian investors’ mineral rights under the Italy-South Africa and Luxembourg-
South Africa BITs due to failing to pay compensation. The claim resulted from South Africa’s 
promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act333 (the ‘MPRDA’) 
which the claimants argued resulted in the indirect expropriation of their old order mineral rights. 
Unfortunately, this case was settled before the tribunal could consider the investor’s claims fully, 
but from the claims and the South African’s Government’s response to the claims, it is telling 
what the Government’s stance is on such claims. 
The claimants raised various expropriation grievances334 against the MPRDA. The most 
relevant grievance for this thesis, however, relates to their claim that their shares in the operating 
companies were directly or indirectly expropriated by the Black Economic Empowerment 
(‘BEE’) equity divestiture requirements which came about as a result of the MPRDA and the 
Mining Charter read together.335 The aforementioned equity divestiture requirements relate to 
existing foreign investors having been required in terms of the Mining Charter to sell 26% of 
their shares in certain mining companies to historically disadvantaged South Africans (the 
‘HDSA indirect expropriation claim’). The unlawfulness in this expropriation claim related to 
the failure by the Government to not pay compensation for the equity divestiture. To understand 
the Government’s defences it is important to understand the background to the Government’s 
case which actually relates to the said BEE provisions as contained in the MPRDA. The 
                                                                
329 Ibid n316, P86. 
330 Ibid n316, P139-140. 
331 ICSID case no ARB(AF)/07/1, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651_En
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332 The policy aspects surrounding this case will be discussed toward the end of this Chapter. It seems that this case 
sparked the change in the country’s investment of policy. 
333 28 of 2002. 
334 Supra n331, paras 59 – 66, P16 - 17. 
335 Ibid n334, P17. 
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promulgation of this Act had the effect of the Government taking hold of ownership of all natural 
resources in South Africa and allowing access to mineral rights only by way of licences. The 
effect was that previous owners of private mineral rights now had to apply for licences in order 
to continue with their mining processes on their properties. The Government denied the claim of 
expropriations, including the HDSA indirect expropriation claim for, inter alia, the following 
reasons:336 
(i) The MPRDA as a ‘generally applicable and non-discriminatory regulation’, did not 
amount to expropriation because there was no prior promise of it not being adopted. 
This makes sense in light of what was discussed above at section 3.1 relating to 
governments not guaranteeing that expropriation will not take place which seems to 
be a sovereign right;337 
(ii) Indirect expropriation is only possible for a substantial deprivation of the investor’s 
rights; and 
(iii) Expropriation cannot be involved where the measure is a way of achieving 
‘legitimate public regulatory purposes’ rationally and proportionally. 
From the above, it is the author’s view that the Government’s main approach in respect of 
the claim of indirect expropriation was to deny the existence indirect expropriation and therefore, 
to deny the existence of the obligation to pay compensation. Without having sight of the 
Government’s submissions to the arbitral tribunal, it is unclear what the basis for Government’s 
defence was.  
What is clear, however, is that investors, like in the Piero Foresti case, have previously 
embarked on challenging South Africa’s BIT commitments on claims for large amounts of 
compensation, albeit not entirely successfully, based also on indirect expropriation.  
This must entail the careful consideration of at least those practical implications possibly 
amounting to indirect expropriation, as discussed in Chapter 1.338 Moreover, the extent to which 
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foreign property rights are infringed by the Bill, according to tests like the UNCTAD test above  
will determine whether these claims constitute indirect expropriation or any form thereof.  
 
   b) Establishing the Lawfulness of Indirect Expropriation 
In the possible event of indirect expropriation being established in the context of the RLHB, the 
Government will have to prove that the indirect expropriation, nonetheless, was lawful in terms 
of the customary law of expropriation.339 This means that the Government acted in line with the 
conditions for expropriation as set out at section 3.1.2.1 above.  
As discussed, to be lawful, expropriation in general requires the following: 
(i) To be for the public order and following due process: 
a. Criticism of the Bill has been that it is more about politics than restoring the wrongs 
of the past because of the relatively small percentage of foreign agricultural land 
ownership in the country.340 Whether this is in fact the truth will have to be shown by 
the Government if ever an investor complains that the Bill constitutes indirect 
expropriation because expropriation is required to be for ‘legitimate welfare 
objectives’ and not for ‘private gain’ or for illegal purposes.341 Legitimate grounds 
have included health, safety and the environment but it has been said that most of 
South Africa’s BITs do not include these grounds as guidelines for what constitutes 
public order.342 
b. What constitutes public order will depend on what governments decide is necessary 
for the welfare of its people and the same holds true for South Africa if faced with 
the enquiry as to why foreign agricultural land ownership is to be restricted.343 For 
this, South Africa will most probably refer to the policy and Constitutional grounds 
                                                                
339 Ibid note 316, Page 27. 
340 The Economist, ‘I had a farm in Africa South Africa takes a populist turn on land reform’, (2015), available at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21645232-south-africa-takes-populist-turn-land-reform-i-
had-farm-africa, accessed on 21 November 2016. 
341 Ibid n316, P29. 
342 Ibid n289, P23. 
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as set out in Chapter 1, and unless a tribunal is not convinced that this prohibition is 
unnecessary for land reform purposes or instituted arbitrary, a tribunal will probably 
accept that the Bill is for the wellbeing of the people. 
c. For the Bill to be in line with due process it implies that the indirect expropriation 
must be in compliance with national legislation or international practice and that 
review thereof is possible independently.344 In South Africa, this should be achieved 
as the introduction and proclamation of all laws have to follow proper procedure and 
any law in conflict with Constitutional values may be challenged.  
 
(ii) To be without discrimination: 
a. This has been said to mean that the indirectly expropriating measure should not 
(i) treat foreigners differently based on their nationality or on where an 
investment originates from and (ii)345 it may not discriminate between foreigners 
and nationals either.346 
b. In my view, the Bill probably will not discriminate based on the nationalities or 
origin of investments as it does not seem to differentiate between foreigners in the 
prohibition of ownership. As long as all foreigners are treated the same, this 
condition should be complied with. 
c. Nevertheless, indirectly expropriating the disposal rights of foreign owners of 
agricultural land, may be seen as discriminating between foreigners and South 
Africans. In the case of Eureko v Poland, for example, a tribunal found that the 
Polish government expropriated a foreign investor’s right to acquire a majority 
shareholding in a privatised governmental insurance company. The aim was to 
retain majority Polish control and exclude foreigner control. The expropriation 
was found to be a ‘blunt violation of the expectations’ of the foreign shareholders 





344 Ibid n316, P36. 




(iii) To be with compensation: 
a. If the Bill is found to lead to indirect expropriation, South Africa will be liable to pay 
compensation to the affected foreign owners of agricultural land. 
b. BITs provide for compensation whenever indirect expropriation has been proven.347Studies 
have shown, that South Africa’s BITs in general have allowed more protection for foreign 
property owners than for South Africans in terms of the Constitution when it comes to 
compensation.348  
c. The way in which compensation will be calculated will depend on the wording of the BITs 
and this is provided for in South African BITs. 
A birds-eye view of these conditions therefore seem to imply that the number one concern 
of the Government should be whether the prohibition of FOAL may constitute indirect 
expropriation of any existing property right before any of the conditions may be raised. To this 
end, the economic impact on FDI and the fact that the Bill constitutes a total ban on FOAL are 
vital considerations.  
 
3.1.2.2 Full Protection and Security of Investments 
In addition to the above, South African BITs all seem to contain this typical form of protection 
from its BIT partners in favour of investors.349 In the South African context this protection is 
detailed under the heading in its BITs entitled: ‘Promotion and Protection of Investments’ and is 
contained in paragraphs that vary in length and detail. An example of one of the seemingly 
shortest and most prevalent of this type of protection found in the Finland-South Africa BIT is 





348 Ibid n289, P22. 
349 Klaeger, P118. 
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 ‘Article 2 Promotion and Protection of Investments  
(a) …
(b) Investments by investors of one Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair
and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory
of the host Party. The host Party shall in no way in its territory, by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, impair the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal of investments by investors of the other Contracting Party.’ [Emphasis
added.]
The concept of full protection and security has been described as being of a general nature 
and encompassing the need of investors to be sheltered against physical violence and violations 
of their rights by operation of the laws of the host state.350 
From the South African example above the writer is of the view that the literal 
interpretation can be made from Article 2(2) that both South Africa and Finland as host states are 
prohibited from doing the following in respect of foreign investments in each other’s countries: 
(i) Impose unreasonable or discriminatory measures;
(ii) Impair management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments
by investors.
As seen above, the latter commitment of South Africa in this regard, may therefore be 
interpreted as protecting Finnish investments against measures which impair the disposal of 
investments. Although not the traditional view, case law developed the idea that states may 
breach their commitment under the commitment of ‘Full Protection and Security’ by more than 
just physical means but also intangibly, through amendment of laws or by administrative 
actions.351 This implies that the country’s laws and administrative decisions should protect 
foreign investor’s rights. An example of this type of protection has taken the form of laws which 
had the effect of an investor’s contract party in the host state cancelling its contract with the 
foreign investor.352 The tribunal in the CME v Czech Republic case found that host states have the 
obligation of ensuring that foreign investments are not ‘withdrawn or devalued’ by laws which 
350 Dolzer & Schreuer, P151. 
351 Dolzer & Schreuer, P151. 
352 CME v Czech Republic, ICSID award, para.613. 
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are promulgated by the state’s administrative bodies. Here, and in relation to the RLHB, the 
question is whether by its enactment, it will create a legal environment in which foreign 
investments will be unsafe through withdrawals and devaluations.  
 
In the context of the Bill, the author makes the following observations regarding withdrawals: 
(i) What will the effect will the Bill have on those sale agreements possibly concluded in 
respect of South African immovable property at the time when the Act is promulgated? 
The author is of the view that this will probably not become an international law issue as 
presumably the South African Legislature will deal with this in terms of transitional 
provisions in the Act once the Bill is promulgated.  
(ii) However, in the event of a sale agreement having to be cancelled as a result of the 
introduction of the Bill, which for some or other reason does not fall under any transitional 
provision, investors might take issue with the Bill. 
(iii)Furthermore, should there be any other contractual agreements between local and foreign 
investors, which are dependent on the conclusion of sale agreements of immovable 
property, foreign investors may be aggrieved by the Bill. 
(iv) In the event the market values of foreign owned properties falling, foreign investors may 
be aggrieved. Whether the devaluation will lead to dispute resolution is, however, another 
question as this will probably depend on the materiality of the devaluation. 
From the above accordingly, it does seem that the promulgation of the RLHB will, in the very 
least, lead to investors from its BIT partner countries carefully consider their existing property 








It is clear that foreign trade and investment have long been important priorities of the current 
South African Government. Not only is the country a participating WTO Member, it has recently 
introduced the PIA which should indicate to its investors that it has an alternative, though not 
perfect, plan to protect foreign investment despite terminating some BITs. This seems to reiterate 
what Nelson Mandela once said: 
‘We are firmly of the belief that the existence of the GATT, and now the World Trade    
Organization, as a rules-based system provides the foundation on which our deliberations can 
build in order to improve … As we enter the new millennium, let us forge a partnership for 
development through trade and investment.’ 
While the restriction of land ownership (including of agricultural land) in the world is not a 
novelty, South Africa is nevertheless bound by the commitments and obligations which it has 
undertaken as both a WTO Member and a BIT contracting party. These commitments and 
protections aim to ensure that all international trading parties, like South Africa, abide by the 
same rules. In its decision to introduce the Bill as a potential new law, South Africa therefore is 
expected to consider the impact that it can have on, for example as discussed in this thesis, its 
international trading parties in services and all its existing BIT partners which include those who 
rely on sunset clauses. 
Even if the implementation of the Bill may not constitute an MFN violation under the 
GATS, it cannot be excluded that South Africa’s services trading parties utilising agricultural 
land in South Africa might feel aggrieved by South Africa now withdrawing future foreign 
ownership of such land. This is because some may be offended by the Bill treating South African 
services providers more favourably by allowing them such ownership rights despite extent 
restrictions. In addition, South Africa might be accused of not complying with its Market Access 
commitment as a result of restricting foreign capital participation in entities owning agricultural 
land. Whilst only time will tell if fellow WTO Members may complain of the Bill violating 
South Africa’s Market Access and National Treatment commitments, the resource and possible 
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reputational losses due to such a complaint should not be underestimated as the RLHB will affect 
both existing and future FOAL. Although it is possible that South Africa could successfully raise 
the justification ground of the Bill being necessary to protect the public order – the question 
remains if the Government has considered all its alternatives. This is especially relevant as it has 
already been determined by academics that the targeting of foreign owned agricultural land 
might not sufficiently support the land reform goals of Government. Foreigners mostly purchase 
residential land, and the full extent of foreign ownership of land is unclear. If South Africa is 
determined to introduce the Bill, however, the author suggests that South Africa should modify 
its GATS Schedule to prevent possible legal claims from WTO Member countries regardless of 
its complexities. 
Furthermore, despite South Africa terminating its BITs and the new protections under the 
PIA, it seems the latter Act does little in providing comfort to new investors, while existing 
investors may be aggrieved by the possible indirect expropriation effects of the Bill under its 
operative BITs. The history of investor-state arbitration worldwide in relation to indirect 
expropriation, of which South Africa has had a taste in the Piero Foresti case, shows that 
investors typically do not shy away from raising this type of claim if domestic laws limit the 
proprietary rights of investors. 
While South Africa’s sovereign right to implement domestic legislation to achieve equality 
amongst its people, is undoubtedly crucial to the future of the country, it is pivotal for South 
Africa to protect its foreign trading partners and investors. South Africa has invited them into to 
the country and is still reliant on them for economic growth. Moreover, while allowing access to 
agricultural land to foreigners by way of long term leases might be a viable option to most 
foreigners utilising agricultural land, it might nevertheless limit the value of investments made 
by foreigners considerably. 
It is the author’s recommendation accordingly, that South Africa revisits this radical 
position vis a vis its foreign trading partners and investors. This does not mean that South Africa 
should not restrict foreign property ownership of agricultural land - but it should consider 
alternatives, such as: (i) improving the implementation of existing land reform policies and 
structures; (ii) significantly improving available statistics on foreign ownership to enable more 
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informed decision-making and responsiveness; and (iii) considering alternative property 
restrictions: like requiring that foreign owners only acquire agricultural land with prior 
permission of the Government. 
The message that the prohibition of foreign ownership of agricultural land might send to 
the rest of the world is that South Africa is limiting its openness to foreign trade and investment. 
It therefore remains to be seen how South Africa will henceforth be perceived particularly given 
that South Africa is a neighbour to countries like Namibia and Zimbabwe which have similar 
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